The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise:
Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal
Literature
A. W.B. Simpsont
One of the curious features of the history of Roman law up to
the time of Justinian is the rarity of legal treatises taking the form
of monographs concerned with the several branches or divisions of
the law.1 Fritz Schulz explained the lack of monographs in terms of
the character of Roman legal science, which he saw as an undertaking that "eschewed legal history, law reform, and legal philosophy, laid stress mainly on case law and problems and was only
mildly interested in system and abstraction." 2 This explanation
might well have been written of the common law too, though no
t
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delivered to the Fourth British Legal History Conference, held at the University of Birmingham in 1979.
' See F. SCHULZ, HISTORY OF RoMAN LEGAL SCIENCE 257 (1946). Schulz noted the existence of only two monographs in the Hellenistic period, Servius's De Sacris Detestandisand
Liber de Dotibus. Id. at 93. The jurisprudence of the classical period, he concluded, "produced hardly any monographs." Id. at 257. The exceptions are works on the stipulation by
Pomponius and Venuleius; Schulz also listed a number of works whose precise form is not
known, some of which may have been monographs resembling modern treatises. Id. at 25357.
, Id. at 257. He argued further that failure to develop a monographic literature was one
of the reasons why "the stream of classical literature eventually ran dry." Id. Remarkable
though it may be as a feat of intellectual organization, even the Digest of Justinian is
crudely arranged and could only have been produced at the end of a long tradition of weakness in systematics. It was not until the eighteenth century that the texts were put into an
ordered state by Pothier, see note 309 infra.
Roman legal science did, of course, produce the form of literature known as institutes,
which contained elementary systematic statements of the divisions and principles of the
whole of private law. This form of literature appears to have been invented by Gaius in the
second century, see A. HONORA, Gmus xii (1962), and is generally thought to have been the
product of the lecture course. Certainly, institutes were teaching books. Other writers followed Gaius's example; among them were Ulpian, Marcian, Paulus, and Callistratus. See F.
SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 156-73. In the end Gaius's Institutes were transformed from textbook to statute. The work was updated by Tribonian, Dorotheus, and Theophilus, and published as a pedagogical text with legislative force in 533 A.D. See A. HONOR9,TRmoNLN 189
(1978). In this version, or, as we would say, edition, the Roman literary form of institutes
has influenced European legal culture since the medieval period. But in the ancient world
Gaius's work never generated monographic treatises in the form of expanded expositions of
its parts. Had this happened we should, presumably, never have been given the Digest.

Rise and Fall of the Treatise
doubt one might wish to qualify it in some respects. Yet eventually
the common law system did generate and sustain a treatise literature, and in nineteenth-century Britain and America treatises became the typical form of legal writing. This is still true in Britain,
but it is remarkable that in the United States the practice of writing treatises has declined significantly. In this article I want to
trace the development of the treatise tradition in the common law
system, and build on an idea suggested but not fully developed by
Schulz's study of the literary activity of the ancient Roman lawyers: the close relation between the forms of legal literature and
lawyers' ideas of what they are doing, and of the appropriate way
for jurists to behave. More radically, I shall suggest that certain
literary forms are closely tied to theories about the nature of law
itself, and that this is particularly true of the treatise. Hence, treatise writing flourished in association with a certain type of legal
theory, and when that theory fell out of favor the practice diminished in importance.
By the term "treatise" various forms of legal literature might
be intended; for present purposes what I have in mind has been
clearly identified by Plucknett in his Early English Legal Literature (he used the term "text-book"):
The characteristic of the modern English text-book. . . is its
method. It begins with a definition of the subject matter, and
proceeds by logical and systematic stages to cover the whole
field. The result is to present the law in a strictly deductive
framework, with the implication that in the beginning there
were principles, and that in the end those principles were
found to cover a large multitude of cases deducible from
them.3
Some subsidiary characteristics also need to be noted. The first is
that the treatise is a monograph, purporting to deal only with a
single branch of the law that is conceived of as possessing some
quality of unity; treatises, like institutional works,4 are not comprehensive, though they are similar in other respects. Thus
Bracton's De Legibus 5 is not a treatise in my sense; nor are Black-

3 T.F.T. PLucKNETr, EARLY ENGLISH LEGAL LITERATURE 19 (1958). Plucknett claimed
that the form was "just about a hundred and fifty years old." Id.
4 See note 2 supra.
8 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (S. Thorne ed. 1968) (lst ed. ca.
1240).
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stone's Commentaries. The second is that the treatise involves
mainly substantive principles, and I exclude those works whose
structure is determined primarily by procedure. Hence Glanvill7 is
not a treatise, while Stephen on Pleading s is. The third is that the
boundary between a good treatise, a bad treatise, and something
that is not worth regarding as a treatise at all is indefinite; the
treatise is an ideal type, and in what follows I shall not be concerned to notice all works that might, arguably, be viewed as treatises of a sort.9

For considerable periods of its history the common law system
produced hardly any treatises at all. In the medieval period the
only one of any significance is Littleton's Tenures (ca. 1481),10 a
work whose origin is mysterious; it is possible-though there is no
evidence of this-that it originated in lectures. The Tenures was
hardly more than a tract, comprising approximately 80,000 words
of law-French text. Although my main concern is with a later period it is worth pausing to consider this notable book, which has
yet to receive full scholarly attention. Dividing the subject matter
into three books, it sets out in a systematic arrangement the basic
definitions, principles, and distinctions that constituted the substantive law of real property. The first book deals with estates, the
I W.
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(Oxford 1765-69).

7THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY
CALLED GLANVILL (G. Hall ed. 1965) (1st ed. ca. 1188).
8 H.J. STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS (London

1824).
9 Bibliographic information in this article is derived from personal examination of the
works discussed, or from J. MARVIN, LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY (Philadelphia 1847), and W. MAXWELL & L. MAXWELL, SWEET & MAXWELL'S COMPLETE LAW BOOK CATALOGUE (1925-57). The
orthography of authors' names conforms to THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (L.

Stephen & S. Lee eds., 22 vol. reprint 1937-39), or to E. Foss, A
OF THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND (1870).
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10 T. LITrLETON, TENORES NovELi (London, ca. 1481). This is the earliest printed common law book of which I am aware, although N. STATHAM, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW
(Rouen, ca. 1481), appears to have been written somewhat earlier, see note 47 infra. The
most recent translation of Littleton is LIrrLETON'S TENURES (E. Wambaugh trans. 1903)
[hereinafter cited as LITTLETON].
So far as institutional works are concerned, there is only one that qualifies, and that is
"Britton," which appeared around 1290. This claims to have been written with royal authority, and it is conceivable that it is imitative of the legislative force of Justinian's Institutes.
The authorship of the work is obscure. The only modem edition is BRIrrON (F. Nichols ed.,
Oxford 1865). "Britton" is the first substantial common law text to appear in law French
rather than Latin.
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second with tenures, and the third, which is much longer," and
much more complex and advanced, deals with "the rest," loosely
linked to what we would call "the concept of title." Though there
is some slight mention of uses in the third book, and their protection was by the 1480s fairly well developed, the books are generally
confined to the common law. There is no sense in which the work
merely systematizes or digests cases; what the books purport to
provide is the theory that enables the reader to understand "the
arguments and the reasons of the law."12 Littleton stated his understanding of the "common learning" of the tiny coterie of lawyers whose views constituted the common law.13 Actual cases are
rarely discussed, though many hypotheticals are, and the author is
quite uninterested in providing authority for his propositions-a
feature that strikingly differentiates the Tenures from many later
treatises. Littleton had no imitators in the fifteenth or sixteenth
century, in spite of the enormous success it enjoyed. The failure of
the work to generate a tradition suggests that it was anomalous
and had no relation, so far as is known, to the regular exercises of
readings and moots established in the late fifteenth century in the
Inns. As to its intellectual basis, I shall say something later in this
article.

It was the fate of Littleton to become the subject of a distinct
literary form, the gloss; the best-known example is Coke's FirstInstitute, or Coke on Littleton.1 The text came to be treated as
though it were itself law; it was regarded with a reverence approaching that accorded an actual statute. 15 Although there were
other works of authority, no other treatise ever achieved this status. It was no doubt Littleton's unique character that explains
Coke's extravagant praise: "This book is the ornament of the Common Laws and the most perfect and absolute Work that ever was
1 The third book contains 509 sections as opposed to the combined total of 240 in the
first two books.
12 LrrETON, supra note 10, at 341. This point is from the epilogue, which was perhaps
not originally part of the text.
,3 See generally Baker, Introductionto 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 123-37 (J.
Baker ed. 1978).
24 E. CoKE, FIRST PART OF THE INSTrruTEs OF THE LAwES OF ENGLAND; OR A COMMENTARY
UPON LrrrTwON (London 1628).

" See, e.g., R. NORTH, DIsCOURSE ON THE STUDY OF THE LAWS 11 (London 1824) ("the
text of Littleton is accounted law, and no other book hath that authority").
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written in any humane science ....
,,16 Placed in its historical
context, the Tenures is indeed a remarkable work. Not only was it
the most successful attempt ever made in the history of the common law to state a single branch of the law as a systematic body of
definitions, principles, and distinctions, it was also virtually the
first such attempt, and did not rely upon an earlier scheme of
17
arrangement.
In the long period between the publication of the Tenures and
the beginning of the eighteenth century there was a massive increase in the quantity and variety of legal literature. The introduction of printing, coupled with the growth in the size of the legal
profession, assisted this development, though for much of the period the printing of common law books was artificially restricted
under the system of royal patents.1" But while attempts were made
to write treatises, practically nothing was achieved. The great
books of the law in this period, the works of St. German, 19
Fitzherbert,2 0 Rastell,2 1 Plowden,2 2 Dyer, Broke,2 4 West,25 and
Rolle,'2 are not treatises. In particular, Coke's chaotic writings do
not fall into this category, and their success depended not on their
literary form, but on the personal authority of their immensely
learned author. The typical forms of literature were collections of
statutes 27 and cases, 28 the two authoritative forms. Parasitic upon
these were systematizing abridgments of cases" and statutes,3 0 in16 E. CoKE, supra note 14, at v (5th ed. London 1656).
17 The scheme of the fourteenth-century tract, the Old Tenures, which Littleton
claimed as his model, see LITTLETON, supranote 10, at 340, was quite distinct. See generally
Arnold, Introductionto THE OLD TENURES, C. 1515, AND THE OLD NATURA BREVIUM, c. 1518,
at ii-vi (1974 ed.).

2 The first of these apparently was obtained by Richard Tottell in 1552. See H. BENNEtt, ENGLISH BOOKS AND READERS (1952).
19 ST. GERMAN'S DOCTOR AND STUDENT (T.F.T. Pluclmett & J. Barton eds. 1974) (1st ed.
London 1530).
20 A. FrrZHERBERT, GRAUNDE ABRMGMENT (London 1514-16).

J.

RASTELL, EXPOSIrIONES TERMINORUM LEGUM ANGLORUM (Longdon 1527).
E. PLOWDEN, LES CoMENTAiREs (London 1588).
23 J. DYER, ASCUN NoUEL CASES (London 1585).
24 R. BROKE, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT (London 1573).
25 W. WEST, SYMBOLEOGRAPHY (London 1594).
16 H. ROLLE, UN ABRIDGEMENT DES PLUSIERS CASES ET RESOLUTIONS DEL COMMON
21
22

LEY

(London 1668).

27 See, e.g., T. BERTHELETI, A TABLE TO ALL THE STATUTES MADE IN THE TYME OF THE

MOST VICTORIOUS REIGNE OF KYNGE EDWARD THE SIXTE (LONDON 1553).
2 See, e.g., T. ASHE, PROMPTUAIRE, OU REPERTORY GENERALL DE LES ANNALES, IT PLUSORS
AUTERS LIVRES DEL COMMON LEY D'ENGLETERRE (London 1614).
29

See, e.g., R. BROKE, supra note 24.
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dices,31 formularies3 2 of various types, glosses"3 on authoritative
texts, and expositions of procedures.3 4 No doubt this generalization
can be qualified somewhat. Sir William Stanford's Les Plees del
Coron (1557)' 5 and his Exposition of the Kinges Prerogative
(1567)31 constitute treatises of a rudimentary sort, and the dedication of the latter makes the point that Stanford was consciously
attempting to produce a new type of book and thought that the
route for doing so lay through the abridgment of cases, the established form of systematizing literature.3 7 Sir Matthew Hole's Historia PlacitorumCoronaes Band Prerogativesof the King 9 also are
exceptions, but were never completed, probably not intended for
publication, and only came to be published in 1736 and 1795,
respectively.
A striking example of an unsuccessful attempt to progress beyond the abridgment form is William Sheppard's Actions upon the
Case,' which appeared in 1663. This is a work of 387 pages, whose
preface to the "judicious and courteous reader" accurately indicates the character of the book:
a Methodical Collection and Report of the various and manifold Cases that this Subject affords in our Books, wherein you
will finde nothing of mine, but the method, or labour of put-

See, e.g., W. RASTELL, ABRMGMENT OF THE STATUTES (London 1533).
See, e.g., T. AsHE, LA TABLE AL LIEUR DES REPORTS DEL TRESREUEREND IUDGE SIR
LAmEs DYER CHIUALER, IADES CHIEFE IUSTICE DEL COMMON BANKE (London 1588).
32 See, e.g., FORMULARE ANGLICANUM (T. Madox ed. London 1702).
33 See, e.g., E. COKE, supra note 14.
U See, e.g., J. RASTELL, THE EXPOSICIONS OF THE TERMS OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND, WITH
30
31

DIVERS PROPRE RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE LAWE, AS WELL OUT OF THE BOOKS OF MAISTER

LITTLETON, AS OF OTHER (London 1563). See also note 80 infra.
35 W. STANFORD, LES PLEES DEL CORON (London 1557).
38 W. STANFORD, AN EXPOSITION OF THE KINGES PREROGATIVE (London

1567).
37 I would wish that amongst such plenty of learned men as be at this day some thing
were devised to help the students of their long journey ...
which thing might well
come to pass after my poor mind, if such titles as be in the great abridgment of Justice
Fitzherbert, were by the Judges or some other learned men labored and studied, that is
to say, every title by itself, by special divisions digested, or ordered and disposed in
such sort, that all the judicial acts and cases in the same might be brought and appear
under certain principles, rules and grounds of the said laws.
Id. at iiii (spelling modernized).
38 M. HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE (London 1736). For discussion of Hale, see
D. YALE, HALE AS A LEGAL HISTORIAN (Selden Society Lecture 1976).
39 M. HALE, THE PREROGATIVES OF THE KING (London 1795).
40 W. SHEPPARD, ACTIONS UPON THE CASE FOR DEEDS, VIZ. CONTRACTS, ASSUmPSrrS,
DECEIPTs, NUSANCES, TROVER AND CONVERSION, DELIVERY OF GOODS, AND FOR OTHER MALEFEASANCE AND MIS-FEASANCE (London 1663).
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ting together, and setting out the grave and learned Judgments, Resolutions and Opinions of the Eminent and Learned
Judges, both of former, and present times therein, where per41
haps you may finde some Repetitions of the same things.
This reflects a persistent problem of status that confronted the
treatise writer in a legal world in which the modern concept of authority, attached peculiarly to judges, had begun to emerge; the
text writer, unless he himself is a judge, possesses as an individual
no authority derived from office. Consequently his views are important only if they are unoriginal, as Sheppard claimed, and if
their authority derives solely from their substance. The preface
also indicates the way in which such a treatise essentially evolved
out of the abridgment tradition, and the text of the book confirms
this. Sheppard starts out boldly in an attempt to state in a systematic way the doctrine embodied not in oral tradition but in the
multifarious published cases, and the book begins at a high level of
abstraction, with a section entitled "of Actions in General. ' '42 This
opens with a definition, followed by analytical subdivisions.
Twenty pages or so later, Sheppard's inability to arrange his material in a coherent manner has reduced the book to a disorderly
abridgment of cases, and by page 202 he has more or less given up.
The rest of the book simply contains abbreviated reports of cases;
the first 395 are described as "Some choice Cases for the illustration, and confirmation of all that is before said about Contracts
and Assumpsits. ' ' 48 Sheppard's failure is traceable at one level to
his lack of analytical skill; he was simply not clever enough at the
job. But more generally, it is noticeable that with the exception of
Stanford and Hale the ablest lawyers who turned to writing in this
period did not select the treatise form as the vehicle of exposition,
presumably because they recognized its extreme difficulty. Thus
Sheppard at least deserves some credit for bravery.
Lawyers and critics were, of course, fully aware of the disorderly and unmethodical appearance of the common law system."
Insofar as the law was merely an oral tradition preserved and
transmitted by those who practiced in Westminster Hall, only long
years of direct involvement could produce the belief that the sysId. at iii.
Id. at 1-20.
Id. at 202.
44 See generally C. HILL, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS oF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 227-33
(1965).
41

42
44
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tern really was rationally coherent. The collapse in the seventeenth
century of the collective exercises of learning in the Inns, 45 the increase in the size of the legal profession, and the proliferation of
nonauthoritative printed texts, could only lend support to the suggestion that the common law was no more than an ungodly jumble,
as Cromwell is said to have described its major ornament, the law
of property. One reaction to all this had been practical. From the
fifteenth century onwards lawyers had been attempting to reduce
the unwieldy mass of legal materials, sometimes for their own personal use and sometimes cooperatively, by digesting it under titles
arranged, for the want of any better system, alphabetically. This
generated the abridgments and common-place books, which remained dominant forms of legal literature until the nineteenth
century.48 The systematizing efforts of the compilers of abridgments could make possible the production of treatise literature
based upon an analysis of the material abridged. This was a process quite distinct from that which produced Littleton's Tenures, a
work that is unrelated to any form of digest or abridgment. Littleton stated the law in a systematic form; he imposed a rational
arrangement for which no earlier model existed. William Stanford,
on the other hand, saw the route from abridgment to treatise, and
attempted to follow it. Less dramatic steps down this road could
be and were taken. Once the material is sorted under titles, the
obvious next move is to order the material within each title systematically by substance, rather than by a random, chronological,
or stream-of-consciousness system. This was not done by Statham
(ca. 1481), ' Fitzherbert (1514-16), 48 or Broke (1573), 4' but was, for

45

See generally W. PREST, THE INNS

OF COURT UNDER ELIZABETH I AND THE EARLY

STUARTS 1590-1640 (1972).
45 The abridgment tradition

has survived in a somewhat modified form in such works
as HALsamrY's LAWS OF ENGLAND (4th ed. 1973 to date) and CoRPuS JuMs SECUNDUM (193779) in America, and in comprehensive digests of cases, such as EIGHTH DECENNIAL DIGEST
(1977-79). See also text at notes 53-54 infra.
47 N. STATHAM, supra note 10. The abridgment traditionally attributed to Nicholas
Statham was first printed about 1481 without attribution. A manuscript survives (Ms. 208,
Guildhall Library, London) that was completed in 1457 for the Principal of Furnival's Inn,
Thomas Segden. I have not examined this manuscript but from its description it appears to
be "Statham."
48 A. FITZHERBERT, supra note 20. Fitzherbert's Graunde Abridgement has been studied
by Boersma, Sir Anthony Fitzherbert:A Biographical Sketch and Short Bibliography, 71
LAw Lm. J. 387, 395-400 (1978). See also Graham & Heckel, The Book that "Made" the
Common Law, 51 LAw Lm. J. 100 (1958).
" R. BROKE, supra note 24. Sir Robert Broke was Chief Justice of the Common Pleas
from 1554 to 1558. His abridgment was published posthumously.
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example, attempted by Rolle (1668),50 and it represents a further
step towards systematization. In its turn, internal subdivision may
generate a rearrangement of titles, so that some, previously independent, are demoted to subsidiary status or broken up into more
than one title. For example, in Viner's Abridgement, 1 within the
title "Actions" we have "Actions (Assumpsit)," elaborately subdivided. Some of the subdivisions, "Assumpsit. Plea. Good. And
How to be Pleaded in Indebitatus Assumpsit, 5' 2 contain material
that, in an earlier abridgment, one would expect to find in a separate title dealing with pleading in actions generally. With systematic subdivision may go attempts to state the law by direct exposition, rather than by stringing together digests of cases. If this is
attempted, the "authorities" move out of the text and into the
notes. Sheppard, as we have seen, tried to do this. The first full
abridgment illustrating this process is Bacon's Abridgement (173659).3 The process culminates either in the splitting up of the
abridgment into separate monographs, or alternatively in the legal
encyclopedia, of which Halsbury's Laws of England (1907-17) is
the classic English example, and the Corpus Iuris (1914-37), and
its second edition, the Corpus Iuris Secundum, the American
counterpart. An extraordinary feature of this evolution of the
abridgment or digest form is the long duration of the process; it is
worth noting, in passing, that in Roman law the development took
even longer.
An alternative to the attempt to refine the crude structure of
the earlier alphabetical abridgments was to react against it and try
to construct, by rational analysis, a new comprehensive scheme for
systematizing the whole of the law. This feat was first attempted
by Hale, and the resulting scheme, his Analysis of the Laws of
England,54 made Blackstone's Commentaries possible, for Blackstone built his work more or less exactly on Hale. Hale's Analysis
in its turn was much influenced by the structure of Justinian's Institutes, which were themselves based on Gaius's Institutes.5

80 H. ROLLE, supra note 26. Henry Rolle's Abridgement may have been the commonplace book that he began as a student. See Baker, The Dark Age of English Legal History,
in LEGAL HISTORY STUDIES 1, 7 (D. Jenkins ed. 1972).
51 C. VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY (Aldershot 1742-53).
52
53

1 id. at 378-79.
M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW (London 1736-59).

51 M.

HALE, ANALYSIS OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

ished posthumously.
11 See note 2 supra.

(London 1713). The work was pub-
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Hence Blackstone's Commentaries are based on a scheme of arrangement dating back some fifteen hundred years, one designed
to give structure to institutional works of a kind foreign to the
common law system.
III
The practical approach to the disorderly condition of the law,
then, was to tidy it up, to systematize it; no particular theoretical
view of the nature of the common law was involved. An alternative
and essentially theoretical approach was to maintain that the law
was already systematic, however improbable this claim might appear to the uninitiated. This generated a peculiar form of legal
literature that predated the rise of the treatise. To explain this I
must digress into jurisprudence.
The first major assault on Professor H.L.A. Hart's celebrated
The Concept of Law58 was launched in 1967 by Professor Ronald
Dworkin in an article entitled The Model of Rules.57 In this and
subsequent writings and revisions Dworkin boldly-and somewhat
improbably-disinterred the belief in the existence and central significance of principles of law, lurking behind and making rational
the apparently disorderly and arbitrary process of adjudication.
Dworkin's more recent and flamboyant exposition of this view has
claimed that there is always, or almost always, a right answer if
one cares to dig,58 and there is now an elaborate literature on the
subject, which pays virtually no attention to the historical pedigree
of the theory involved-and the theory, like most things in jurisprudence, is of extreme antiquity.
It is not my concern in this article to discuss the theory analytically, but to relate it to the history of legal literature. So far as
the civilian systems are concerned, numerous scholarly studies
have already appeared, and as an amateur in that field I can only
refer to Professor Peter Stein's brilliant Regulae Iuris,59 in which
he traces the history of the juristic rules, the regulae, formulated
and collected by the classical Roman jurists through the medieval
period into modern times, and investigates the ideas about law
56

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
'7 Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 14 (1967). See R. DWo1KiN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977), for a general statement of the theory.
ETy

" This thesis is advanced in Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in
(P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977).

a$P.

STEIN, REGULAE IRuIs

(1966).
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that were associated with this process. With regard to the medieval
common lawyers, they appear to have had little enthusiasm for the
self-conscious analysis of what they were doing. Legal method did
not interest them; hence the yearbooks are largely devoid of discussions of the nature of the common law or the theory of legal
reasoning. There are, however, indications that the late medieval
common lawyers had come to accept the idea that the common law
was based in part upon what were called maxims or principles.
This notion finds elaborate expression in Fortescue's De Laudibus
(ca. 1470),6 0 where the principia, maxima, or universalia of the
common law are identified with the regulae iuris of the civilians.6 1
Indeed, quite a number of the maxims of the common law
originated in a collection of regulae iuris in the Digest of Justinian
6 2 Their
or in a collection embodied in the Corpus Iuris Canonici.
use was related to ideas developed in antiquity by Aristotle and
Cicero," and to general theories of logical reasoning. At least after
Fortescue's time, the belief in a set of inner principles of the common law became widespread, and was made even more familiar
through the discussion in St. German's Doctor and Student of the
six grounds (fundamenta) of the law of England, which included
"dyvers pryncyples that be called by those learned in the lawe
maxymes. ' 64 These maxims or principles were thought to possess

certain special qualities. First, they were ultimate in that they
could not be supported by any further arguments or logical demonstrations; hence it was idle to argue with anyone who doubted their
validity, and equally idle to attempt to demonstrate a principle by
arguments from authority. 5 Second, they were thought to be self60 SIR JOHN FoRTEscuE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE (S. Chrimes ed. 1942) (1st ed.
London 1545). Fortescue wrote this book between 1468 and 1471, but it was not printed
until 1545. Id. at ix.
61 Id. at 21.

12 See 2 CORPUS IuIs CANONICI 1122-23 (A. Friedberg ed. 1875); P. STEIN, supra note
59, at 148-52.
" The relationship between the ideas of Aristotle and Cicero and the evolution of regulae iuris and maxims is discussed in P. STmN, supra note 59, at 26-48. See also Honor6,
Legal Reasoning in Rome and Today, 4 CAMBRIAN L.J. 58 (1973).
4 ST. GERMAN, supra note 19, at 57.
65 The essential ideas are developed by Aristotle under the rubric "First Principles" in
his Posterior Analytics. First principles are known by intuition. Although they cannot
themselves be proven by scientific knowledge, they are an essential prerequisite to such
knowledge. ARiSTOTLE, PosTERmioR ANALrcs 2.19. These inherent qualities are also present
in the late Hans Kelsen's jurisprudential theory, in which the assumed existence and validity of the Grundnorm is the essential prerequisite to the pure science of law. See generally
H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (A. Wedberg trans. 1945).
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evidently rational. Third, they had always been accepted, and thus
they were timeless features of a timeless system. Finally, although
only skilled lawyers could work out the detached application of
principles, even a layman could, by knowing the principles, acquire
a general knowledge and understanding of the law. With the belief
in principles went the belief that there always was a right answer,
and in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries disagreement among
the judges was regarded not as a reason for voting, but as a reason
for continuing the debate until answers appeared; hence the interminable argument of great cases over periods of years. 6
I do not intend to discuss whether the law "really" did rest on
principles, but to investigate the relationship between the belief in
their existence and the forms of legal literature. The natural reaction to the claim is to ask for a statement of the principles, a request that was sometimes handled rather evasively. Thus in Doctor
and Student the Doctor is made to remark, "I should like to hear
some of these maxims," to which the Student obligingly replies, "A
large volume would not suffice to declare them fully, of which maxymes however, in answer to your request I shal hereafter shewe the
part. '67 The large volume was not forthcoming; merely twenty-five
were offered."8 In the seventeenth century, when the somewhat
similar claim for the existence of "fundamental laws" was common,
Edmund Walker, in the course of Strafford's impeachment, naively
asked to be told what they were. Sergeant Maynard crushed him
by saying that, "if he did not know that, he had no business to sit
in this House." 9 But no list whatsoever was supplied.70 Professor
Stein noticed that the earliest English treatise, Littleton's Tenures, "was the first exposition of English land law as a system
based on principles instead of as a number of disconnected formulae concerning the procedure of real actions."7 1 He points out that
the author in a number of passages actually uses the terms "princi-

'
'8

See Baker, supra note 13, at 156-63.
ST. GERMAN, supra note 19, at 59.

Id. at 59-67.

"Quoted in J.

GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

214

n.A (1955).
7*

One is reminded of the modem jurisprudential theory of a rule of recognition, whose

existence is asserted, but never made flesh; that is to say, no attempt is made to formulate
specifically any rule of recognition. See H.L.A. HART, supranote 56, at 92-107. See also note
65 supra. The theory of principles did rather better. Thus St. German did offer at least a
short list of maxims, see text at note 68 supra, and the theory produced a considerable
literature.
" P. STEIN, supra note 29, at 159.
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ple" and "maxim" to refer to basic propositions of law.72 It is difficult to be sure that Littleton was, as it were, self-consciously expressing a legal theory in the Tenures, but I suspect that Stein is
correct for a reason that he does not mention: the absence in the
text of any reliance on cases as authorities. Maxims needed neither
authority nor support from argument, and none could be provided.
Coke put it thus: "Un maxime en ley. A maxime is a proposition to
be of all men confessed and granted without proofe, argument, or
discourse. Contra negantem principia non est disputandum.' '37
Dr. John H. Baker has pointed out that the Tenures was called les
grounds de Master Littleton, so that it was conceived of in the
terms Stein has suggested. 4
But the chief literary expression of the theory of principles
produced a form of literature very different from Littleton's Tenures, and one that is now quite extinct. In something of the same
spirit with which the compilers of the Digest had lumped together
in title 50 (De Diversis Regulis Iuris Antiqui) a disorderly collection of regulae iuris,75 so common lawyers set about the task of
making and publishing and, inevitably, commenting upon, collections of legal maxims. The best-known early example of this form
of literature is Bacon's collection of twenty-five maxims, 7 6 originally submitted to Queen Elizabeth I in 1597 as a specimen of a
general scheme to make the common law more coherent and intelligible to both lawyers and laymen. Bacon had in mind a general
plan for the restatement of English law, but he did not wish to
turn the system into a codification or, as he put it, into "text-

' LrrrLEToN, supra note 10, §§ 3, 90, 648; see P. STEmN, supra note 59, at 159-60. Coke
comments on section 3,

Maxime, i.e., a sure foundation or ground of art ... so sure and uncontrollable as that
they ought not to bee questioned. And that which our author here and in other places
calleth a Maxime, hereafter he calleth a principle; and it is all one with a RULE, a COMMON GROUND, POSTULATUM, or an AxIOMz, and it were too much curiositie to make nice
distinctions betweene them. And it is well said in our bookes, "nest my a disputer

lancient principles del ley."
E. CoKE, supra note 14, at ff. 10b-lla.
11 E. COKE, supra note 14, at f. 67a. See also id. at f. 343a. The Latin phrase means
roughly that "it is impossible to argue with one who disputes your first principles."
7" Baker, supra note 13, at 161 n.7.
7' See also text and note at note 62 supra.
76 F. BACON, A COLLECTION OF SOME PRmNCIPALL RULaS AND MAXIMES OF THE COMMON
LAWES OF ENGLAND (London 1630), in ELEMENTS OF TM COMMON LAwEs OF ENGLAND
(London 1630).
For descriptions of Bacon's scheme and the various genres involved in it, see 5 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 485-89 (1936); P. STIN, supra note 59, at 170-74.
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law."'7 8 A collection of maxims, together with a book of Institutes7 9

and a book of Terms of the Law, 0 was to operate principally at an
educational level; the main body of the restatement was to consist
of abridgments8s Bacon's collection was not the first to be published; in 1546 there had appeared Principiasive Maxima Legum
Angliae,82 a short, anonymous work, and in 1618 Ashe produced
his Handfull of Flowers."8 After the publication of Bacon's Maxims in 1630, various other collections appeared, including William
Noye's Treatise of the Principall Grounds and Maximes of the
Lawes of This Kingdom in 1641'84 and Edmund Wingate's Maximes of Reason in 1658.85 Noye's was a small book, originally written in law French; it claimed to be a summary consideration of the
whole law, divided into the laws of reason, custom, and statutes.8 6
These three sources constituted the "grounds" of the law of England; the first, reason, was the ground of the common law itself. In
the section on the common law are listed a number of maxims
under the subdivisions Theology, Grammar, Logic, Philosophy, Political and Moral Rules, and Law Construction. These maxims are
then illustrated and explained. Wingate's is a much more considerable work than Noye's; in some 772 pages, it sets out and comments upon some 214 maxims. e7 Wingate had a legal theory, which
78 13 THE WORKS OF Sm FRANCIS BACON 67 (J. Spedding ed. 1872).
79

This was to be "a key and general preparation" to reading the body of the law. Id. at

70.
o This form of legal literature originates with J. RASTELL, supra note 34, a legal word

book that in various forms went through 28 editions between 1527 and 1742, and surfaced in
an American reprint as late as 1819. Such works also could be linked to a theory of law. Cf.
F. STRou, A JUDICmL DICTrONARY (1890), in which a legal word book was assigned a role in
achieving the aims of British imperialism: Stroud believed that law was a language, and if
the whole British empire spoke the same legal language there would be uniformity of law. In
fact, the dictionary was widely used by colonial officers as part of a portable law library, and
the work is still current in England.
81 The remaining book of the restatement was to be a compilation of ancient laws, De
Antiquitatibus Juris. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 77, at 488.
82 ANON., PRiNciA SrE MAXIMA LEGUM ANGLIAE (n.p. 1546).
" T. AsHE, FASCicULUS FLORUM OR A HANDFULL OF FLOWERS GATHERED OUT OF TIM
SEVERALL BooKEs OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE SIR EDWARD COKE (London 1618).

W. Noyz, TRzATnSE OF THE PRINCIPALL GRouNDEs AND MAxIMEs OF THE LAwEs OF
THIS KINGDOM (London 1641). The sixth edition (London 1792) discusses 48 maxims in 163
pages. The work went through nine editions up to 1821 in England, and three printings in
America (1808, 1824, 1845).
83 E. WINGATE, MAXIMES OF REASON (London 1658).
s6 W. NoYE, supra note 84, at 1, 18-19 (2d ed. London 1651).
87 These include, interestingly enough, as number 147, "None shall take benefit or advantage of their own wrong." E. WINGATE, supra note 85, at 568. The ultimate source of this
maxim is Ulpian in Digest 50.17.134.1 where it appears as "nemo ex delicto meliorem suam
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he set out in the flamboyant prose of the time:
Not all Lawes that are Just and Prudent ought to be used as
Radii and Effluxes from the Eternal Wisdom, having thus Exemplar Cause and bright Idea in God himself. The mediate
Author of these is humane Reason, exalted and purified by
Learning and Experience, and enlightened by the Divine
Spirit; I presume there is no fear of Sofinians in Law, and that
attempts may be made without charges, to discover how the
vast multitude of Cases, that Follies, or Passions, or Necessities of men have obliged us to be acquainted with, are all accountable and reducible to some few Theses; which being
prime Emanations and General Maximes of Reason, govern
and serve for a Clue and Conduct, through the Labyrinth of
that perplext variety; Saving us the labour of Chargeing our
memories with every particle, then to burden and confound
US.

ss

Later works in the same tradition appeared in the eighteenth
century,89 the most successful perhaps being Richard Francis's
Maxims of Equity,9 0 which went through five editions in England
conditionemfacere potest." The maxim is well known to students of modem jurisprudence,
because it features prominently in Professor Dworkin's article The Model of Rules, supra
note 57. Dworkin presents the maxim as an illustration of a principle, his argument being
that principles, as contrasted with rules, figure prominently in critical legal decision. The
context of this argument is Dworkin's discussion of Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 22
N.E. 188, 190 (1889), where the majority opinion relied on the proposition that
all laws as well as all contracts may be controlled in their operation and effect by general fundamental maxims of the common law. No one shall be permitted to profit by
his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his
own crime.
In this case, the principle in question is supposed by the court to be a maxim based on
public policy and founded in universal law, that is, natural law. Dworkin's own theory is of
course different
" E. WINGATE, supra note 85, at iii.
" The principal eighteenth-century work is the anonymous GROUNDS AND RUDIMENTS
OF LAW AND EQurY (London 1749; 2d ed. London 1751); see text and notes at notes 99-100
infra. See also 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 77, at 189. Thomas Branch's PRINc1PiA LEGs
ET AEQUrrATIS (London 1753), containing 2000 maxims, principles or rules, definitions, and
"memorable sayings," also was successful. It went into five English editions up to 1824;
there also was an American edition in that year. Capell Loift's REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH (London 1776; 2d ed. Dublin 1790) includes a collection of
maxims. Lofft also edited PmNCnPmA CUM JuIs UNvnMSALIS TUM P&CRAIPUE ANGLICANI
(London 1779).
9OR. FRANcIS, MAXIMS OF EQUITY (London 1727). See generally 12 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 77, at 188. Francis's book purported to demonstrate that equity was not arbitrary. It lists and comments upon 14 maxims, all of which are in English. Other collections
include a considerably larger number. The modem view seems to be that there are only 12.
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from 1727 to 1746, and eventually crossed the Atlantic to appear in
Richmond, Virginia in 1823. This work was the first printed book
on Equity, preceding by ten years the curious work attributed to
Ballow.9 1 In the nineteenth century the best known example is
Broom's Legal Maxims, an enormously successful work that ran to
ten editions between 1845 and-incredibly-1939 2 In the third
edition, printed in 1858, Broom comments upon 105 maxims and
lists 595, mainly in Latin, though a few are in law French; he arranged them under ten subject categories. Herbert Broom was a
law teacher who lectured as Reader to the Inns of Court. He was a
prolific author,9 and his book was intended primarily for students,
though he hoped it might be useful to the barrister "who may be
desirous of applying a Legal Maxim to the case before him.' ' "
Broom had a legal theory; he possessed a view of the place of maxims or principles that he set out in the preface to his Maxims:
In the Legal Science, perhaps more frequently than in any
other, reference must be made to first principles. Indeed, a
very limited acquaintanceship with the earlier Reports will
shew the importance which was attached to the acknowledged
Maxims of the Law, in periods when civilization and refine95
ment had made comparatively little progress.
In simpler ages reference to these maxims "so manifestly founded
in reason, public convenience, and necessity, as to find a place in
the code of every civilized nation,"9 solved most problems; the
complexity of modern life, though reducing the utility of maxims,
See Pound, On Certain Maxims of Equity, in CAMBRIDGE LEGAL ESSAYS 259 (1926).
'1 ANON., TRATISE OF EQUITY (London 1737). The 1737 edition appeared anonymously.
It was first credited to Ballow in a glossed, two-volume edition edited by John Fonblanque
and published in London in 1793-94. Fonblanque purported to rely on "general report," see
2 id. at v-ix. The contemporaneous third edition, published in Dublin in 1792, claims that
Sir Geoffrey Gilbert, see text and notes at notes 137-156 infra, was the author. The Fonblanque version went through five English editions. It also was popular in the United States,
where it went through four editions before Story's treatise, see text and notes at notes 276285 infra, supplanted it.
"s H. BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS (London 1845). P. HALKERSTON, A COLLECTION OF LATIN MAXIMS AND RULES IN LAw AND EQUITY (Edinburgh 1823) is another nineteenth-century work; it was used by Broom. Further examples are J. PmL.MoR, PRiNciPLES AND MAXIMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (London 1856), and J. RAM, THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL
JUDGEMENT (London 1834).
9s Broom was best known in his time for his COMMENTARIES ON TE COMMON LAw
(London 1856).
04 H. BROOM, supra note 92, at ii.
95Id. at i.
96 Id.
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has not deprived them of fundamental importance. Some are "deductions of reason" rather than "Rules of law,

'9 7

and therefore can

only be illustrated.Broom implies here that specifically legal maxims require support from authority, in order to show their general
acceptance, and by way of illustration, qualification, or exception.98
Broom's text is not, however, primarily concerned to demonstrate
the reception of the maxims by citing authority; this is a subsidiary
function. The major eighteenth-century collection, Grounds and
Rudiments of Law and Equity (1749), 91 an anonymous work by a
Middle Templar, had adopted a similar theoretical position, and
attempted by illustrating the maxims through cases to show that
the maxims or rules were indeed the basis of judicial decisions.
The book, with its 526 maxims, contains "A Collection of Rules or
Maxims, with the Doctrine upon them, illustrated by various Cases
extracted from the Books and Records, to evince that these Principles have been the Foundation upon which the Judges and Sages
of the Law have built their solemn Resolutions and Determinations." 100 This clearly states the theory of the priority of principles
over decisions; the principles were the basis of decided cases, not
the reverse. But the rise of the notion of judicial auctoritasbased
on office or status could also lead to the idea that maxims needed
proof by the authority of judicial decisions. This, for example, was
Francis's idea; his maxims of equity were "Collected from
and
101
Authority."
best
the
of
Books
the
of
out
Cases,
by
proved
In theory, collections of maxims could be arranged not by an
alphabetical scheme, but by some more rational substantive
method, and thereby produce a structure for ordering the law. Indeed, to this day there are portions of legal treatises that could as
well be presented as commentary upon maxims-for example, the
section of a criminal law treatise on mens rea, organized around

9

Id. at ii.

"8 Id. at i.
99GROUNDS AND RUDIMENTS OF LAW AD EQUITY, supra note 89. This work contains
short reports of numerous House of Lords cases, and fear of trouble over privilege presumably is the reason for the author's anonymity. The author claimed that his work was superior to that of Wingate, see text and notes at notes 87-88 supra, and W. PHILLIPS, THE
PRINCIPLES OF LAW REDUCED TO PRACTICE (London 1662). He faulted the former for being

too prolix and containing too few principles, and the latter for being too superficial-and
concluded that neither was "fit to be put into the Hands of a young Student." GROUNDS AND
RUDIMENTS OF LAW AND EQUITY, supra note 89, at iii (2d ed. London 1751).
100 GROUNDS AND RUDIMENTS OF LAW AND EQUITY, supra note 89, title page (2d ed.
London 1751).
101 R. FRAN CIs, supra note 90, title page.
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the maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.102 Back in the
seventeenth century, as Dr. Prest has shown,103 logical schemes for
methodizing the law (or any other body of learning) enjoyed a considerable vogue, and such schemes could be applied to the maxims
of the law in an attempt to produce a systematic exposition of legal
principles. The most notable product of this process was Finch's
Law,1 04 posthumously published in 1627, whose arrangement later
influenced institutional writers, particularly Thomas Wood 05 and
in some degree perhaps Blackstone, but not, apparently, Hale.
Finch adopted the practice of setting out the law by first stating
"the Maximes and positive grounds of the law,"10 distinguished
typographically in bold-face Gothic; then he added relevant statutory material. This was followed by the "proofes and examples of
those Maximes," 1 7 which formed the second division, again distinguished typographically. The third section dealt with the royal
prerogative as related to the maxim or maxims in question. Before
dealing with the substantive law, Finch devoted Book I to what we
would call the general part, and he provided an exposition of such
basic legal ideas as the law of nature, legal fictions, and positive
laws;108 this includes a statement of general legal principles (set
out as maxims) derived from other disciplines, such as grammar,
logic, morality, and natural philosophy. Here, for example, appears
the maxim that "no man shall take a benefit of his owne wrong,"
catalogued as a moral rule.109 Finch's classification of maxims in
this manner-by reference to their source-is also found elsewhere. Thus, in Doddridge's English Lawyer (1631)110 the sources
& A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 191-246 (1972).
Prest, The Dialectical Origins of Finch's Law, 1977 CAM. L.J. 326.
10H. FINCH, LAW, OR, A DiscouRsE THEREOF (London 1627). For a full discussion of
this work, as well as of Finch's NoMOTscHwA (London 1613), see Prest, supra note 103.
1o5 T. WooD, AN INsTTuTE OF TH LAWS OF ENGLAND OR THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN THEIR
NATURAL ORDER, ACCORDING TO COMMON LiE (London 1720). This was a two-volume octave
edition. The basic scheme adopted divides the material into four books: "Of Persons," "Of
Estates," "Of Crimes and Misdemeanors," and "Of the Courts of Justice, or, Jurisdiction of
the Courts." This arrangement is similar to Finch's scheme, but differs from Blackstone's:
"Of the Rights of Persons," "Of the Rights of Things," "Of Private Wrongs," and "Of Public Wrongs." See also note 161 infra.
10s E.g., W. LAFAva
105

106H. FINCH,

supra note 104, at ii.

Id.
108Id. at 1-76.
0 This is presented as a deduction from the propositions that "The Law favoreth right
[and] Hateth wrong." Id. at 45-46.
110 J. DODDRIDGE, THE ENGLISH LAWYER (London 1630) had been preceded in 1629 by a
defective and incomplete version entitled The Lawyers Light. The English Lawyer was
based in part on Ramist logic. See Prest, supra note 103, at 328. Doddridge divided maxims
17
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are logic, natural philosophy, moral philosophy, civil law, canon
law, and finally "from Use, Custom and Conversation of Men."11 1
Michael Hawke's The Grounds of the Lawes of England (1657)112
is another example; Hawke praises Finch, who, he says, "hath endeavonred [sic] and fairely proceeded in reducing not onely the
body of our Lawes into a compendious method, but also the
grounds and rules of the same into an Academicall order."' 13
Finch's methodical scheme for expounding the "body of our
Lawes"-what we would call substantive law-was workable and,
until Hale produced a better one, the best to be found; nevertheless, his schematic division of maxims by sources, although interesting jurisprudentially,' 4 was a dead end and could never have
formed the basis for either institutional or monographic expositions of the law. The last collection to methodize maxims according
to an elaborate scheme was Edmund Wingate's Maximes of Reason (1658); 1" later collectors of maxims, such as the author of
Grounds and Rudiments of Law and Equity, returned to an alphabetical scheme."'
Though Broom continued to be edited until 1939, and although maxims still feature in legal exposition, argument, and justification, they are now regarded as slightly comical, and the form
of literature directly related to them is dead. It is noticeable that
in modern English theoretical works they are hardly ever mentioned as "sources of law."'1' The decline in popularity of this form

into those that applied generally throughout the law, and those that applied to only one
title. An example of the latter is "ex nudo pacto non orituractio," J. DODDRIDGE, supra, at
164, which applied only to contract law.
J. DODDRIDGE, supra note 110, at 161.
n M. HAWKE, THE GROUNDS OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (London 1657). In the preface
to this work Hawke sets out an elaborate statement of his theoretical approach to the law,
and acknowledges his debt to Bacon, Finch, and Doddridge. What are variously called
"principles," "maxims," "eruditions," and "grounds," id. at iii,
constitute "a foundation in
Law, upon whose reason the structure of many particular Cases doth stand," id. at iv. The
only way to combat the prolixity of the law is to expound it by way of grounds or rules and
their exceptions, as other sciences are expounded. Id. at vi.
12 Id. at iii.
I" In modern analytical jurisprudence there has been much discussion of the extent to
which judicial decisions (or other logical conclusions) can be justified by specifically legal
reasons; there are various terminologies in which this matter is aired.
E. WINGATE, supra note 85.
"-6 There are minor exceptions, such as the collection by Phillimore, see note 92 supra.
11
They linger on in the appendix to J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 525-31 (11th ed.
1957), and they receive a brief mention in G. PATON, A TExT-BoOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 59
(4th ed. 1972). But even in C.K. Allen's LAw IN THE MAKING (1927) they are not accorded

the status of independent sources of law. (This book, which originated in a series of lectures
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of literature is partly explicable in terms of the rise of the treatise,
which expounded the law in a way more coherent than was possible by any rearranged scheme of maxims. Three other factors
may have been significant. First, it came to be thought improper to
invent maxims; one could only collect them like zoological specimens. By their nature they ought to be as established and antique
as possible. Hence, the collector was inhibited from attempting a
more elegant and satisfactory exposition of the law; he was condemned to unoriginality. Second, maxims had to be in another language, normally Latin, and a text built upon them could not continue to command respect after the fall from dominance of the
traditional classical education; stylistically, the use of Latin maxims, once thought elegant, is now a subject for ridicule. Third, the
tradition enshrined in collections of maxims was that the entire
common law system possessed an intellectual unity. This view gave
way to the idea that branches of the law form coherent wholes.
Even this latter view is now doubted. Maxims have come to seem
not just antique but archaic. The form of literature associated with
them has died out, but the legal theory upon which they rested
came to find a different form of expression in the treatise.
IV
Plucknett regarded the treatise as essentially a product of the
nineteenth century, and suggested 11 8 that when its history came to
be written, the great name associated with the genre would be that
of Joseph Story, whose first treatise, one of nine, appeared in
1832.111 Story chose bailments as the first branch of the law to expound, and it is not without significance that the same area had
been made the subject of an earlier and celebrated treatise by a
great scholar, Sir William Jones, whose Essay on the Law of Bailments 12 - had first been published half a century earlier, in 1781. As
a reviewer in The American Jurist pointed out, Story's work was
far more comprehensive; he called Jones's book "a mere sketch or
in India in 1926, and is the most elaborate discussion of the judicial process by an English
author in this century, is dominated by a theory of stare decisis.) It is hardly surprising to
discover that maxims are not discussed in the more recent literature. I doubt whether the
revival, in a new guise, of the theory associated with them will generate new collections of
legal principles for Dworkin's ideal judge, "Hercules," see R. DWORKIN, supra note 57, to
rely on.
'18 T.F.T. PLUCKNET,

supra note 3, at 19.

119 See text and notes at notes 276-284 infra.
12oW. JoNEs, AN EssAY ON THE LAW OF BArmENTs

(London 1781).
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outline of some of the most prominent rules of law upon the subject" and claimed that it was "much over-rated.""1 2 This may be a
fair comparative judgment, but Jones did write the first treatise on
the subject, and in treatise writing, as in mountaineering, a special
significance is rightly accorded to those who achieve firsts and
thereby demonstrate that the feat is in fact possible. Actually, a
considerable number of treatises were written in the eighteenth
century, and it was then that the treatise tradition became established. Yet the new form of legal literature, though it came to supplant the collections of maxims, was nevertheless based on the
same theory of the nature of law.
The great legal publishing event of the century was of course
the appearance of Blackstone's Commentaries in 1765-69,22 preceded by his Analysis of the Laws of England in 1756.12' The
Commentaries originated in lectures delivered at Oxford from 1753
onwards.1 24 After 1758 Blackstone delivered these lectures as
Vinerian Professor; the endowment of the chair was derived in part
from the other major legal publication of the century, Charles
Viner's twenty-three-volume abridgment (1741-57).125 Blackstone
was an institutional work, not a treatise, but its success and the
resulting fame of its author must have encouraged the production
of monographic literature. Certainly, before his work appeared few
monographs of any substance were published. Booth on Real Actions (1701)126 hardly counts, as its concern is with procedure, and
with archaic procedure at that. Sir Martin Wright's Introduction
to the Law of Tenures (1730)127 is essentially a historical work,
written in the spirit of one who believes that law, or at least certain
branches of it, can be understood only historically; this belief was
strongly held by Blackstone and has permanently influenced text
writers. The work itself is not, however, a treatise in any sense.
Apart from embryonic works such as Ballow1 28 and Nelson, 129 we
are left with only two treatise writers before Blackstone: Hawkins
121

12
123

7 Am. JuRIST 128, 137 (1832).
W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6.
W. BLACKSTONE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND (Oxford 1756).

"I See generally 12 W.
115
126

HOLDSWOnTH, supra note 77, at 702-37.
C. VINER, supra note 51.
G. BOOTH, NATURE AN PRACTICE OF RiAL ACTIONS, IN THEIR WRITS AND PROCESS

(London 1701).
127 M. WRIGHT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TENURES (London 1730). There were four
English and three Irish editions between 1730 and 1792.
128 H. BAIAow, supra note 91.
129 W. NELSON, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (London 1717).
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and Gilbert.
Sergeant William Hawkins (1673-1746) was a Cambridge graduate and an Inner Temple man, and his Treatise of the Pleas of
the Crown ran through seven editions in the eighteenth century
and one in the nineteenth.13 0 Hawkins was able to utilize earlier
works, particularly Coke's Third Institute,' as a quarry. This in
part explains the provenance of the work; it belongs to a tradition
started by Stanford3 2 and continued by Pulton3 5 and Coke. But
the principal obstacle to institutional or treatise writing is the
daunting problem of arranging methodically what is essentially
disordered material; given a usable scheme, primarily what is
needed is hard work, coupled, of course, with some analytical ability. Hawkins, like Blackstone after him, relied on a scheme devised
by Sir Mathew Hale; 13 in a real sense both works were posthumous products of Hale's analytical skill. The motivation of Hawkins is explained in the preface. He set out "to vindicate the Justice and Reasonableness of the Laws concerning criminal Matters,
and to reduce them into as clear a Method, and explain them in as
familiar a manner, as the Nature of the Thing will bear."1 5 The
"method" was in reality Hale's product, not Hawkins's. A considerable body of tract literature critical of various aspects of the criminal law had appeared by the mid-seventeenth century, 36 and the
generally defensive tone of Hawkins's preface perhaps shows that
he was responding to this literature in a general way. But his books
can probably be more easily explained as an emanation of the deep
reverence for reason associated with the natural law school of
thought. Though Hawkins never developed an original theory, his
expressed aim places his treatise firmly in a tradition exemplified
by many later works; the substantive law expounded is based not
130W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (London 1716-21). Hawkins
received his M.A. in 1693 and became Sergeant of Law in 1723. Little is known about him;
the article in 9 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 230 (1939) is slim. He also compiled an
abridgment of Coke on Littleton and a collection of statutes, as well as a summary of his
great treatise.
131E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING
HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CASES (London 1644).
"I W. STANFORD, supra note 35.
1SS F. PULTON, DE PACE REGIS ET REGNI (London 1609).
134 M. HALE, SUMMARY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (London 1678) reached its fourth
edition by 1694.
W. HAWKINS, supra note 130, at i.
"" See D. VEALL, THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR LAW REFORM 1640-1660, at 127-41
133

(1970).
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so much on authority as on human reason. This is not to say that
Hawkins set out to write a speculative work; his writing is severely
down-to-earth and practical in character, and the theory rests
lightly on his work.
Sir Geoffrey Gilbert's (1675-1726) position in the history of
the treatise is far more intriguing and problematical, for although a
fair amount is known about his writings they have never been
made the subject of a modern study, as they deserve. A considerable corpus of monographic writing is attributed to him, all of it
published posthumously. In addition to two collections of reports,
monographs on no less than fifteen distinct branches of the law
appeared in print between 1730 and 1763.1' They dealt with the
following subjects, in order of their appearance: Tenures, 3 8 Uses
and Trusts plus Dower, 189 Ejectment,'" Court of Common Pleas, 41
Evidence, 4 2 Devises,14 s Distress and Replevin,'" Court of Chancery, 45 Court of Exchequer,"" Rent, 4 7 Debt, 4 8 the Constitution, 4 9
and Executions plus King's Bench.8 0 In addition, considerable
parts of Matthew Bacon's five-volume New Abridgment of the
Law' 5 ' (published between 1736 and 1766) were lifted from manuscripts of Gilbert, 52 and in the fifth edition of that work by Sir
Henry Gwillim in 1798 a treatise by Gilbert on Remainders was
published from one of Francis Hargrave's manuscripts. 5 3 A trea137 In addition, Gilbert may be the author of the treatise on Equity first published
anonymously in 1737 and generally attributed to Henry Ballow. See note 91 supra.
118 G. GILBERT, TREATISES OF TENURES (London 1730).

139 THE LAW OF USES AND TRUSTS COLLECTED AND DIGESTED IN A PROPER ORDER FROM
THE REPORTS OF ADJUDGED CASES, IN THE COURTS OF LAW AND EQUrrY AND OTHER BOOKS OF
AUTHORITY TOGETHER WITH A TREATISE OF DOWER (London 1734).
140 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF EJECTmENTs (London 1734).
141 HISTORY AND PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
142 LAW OF EVIDENCE

(London 1737).

(Dublin 1734).

143 THE LAW OF DEVISES, LAST WILLS, AND REVOCATIONS (London
144 Tim LAW OF DISTRESSES AND REPLEVINS (London

1756).

1757).

145 THE HISTORY AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY

(London 1758).

148 A TREATISE ON THE COURT OF EXCHEQUER (London 1758).
147 TREATISE ON

RENTS (London 1758).

EQUITY (London 1760).
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTION, IN KING'S BENCH AND CHANCERY (London 1760).
160THE LAW OF EXECUTIONS; TO WHICH ARE ADDED THE HISTORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
148 A TREATISE ON THE ACTION OF DEBT, IN CASES IN LAW AND
149

A

COURT OF KING'S BENCH, AND SOME CASES TOUCHING WILLS OF LANDS AND GOODS (London

1763).

151M. BACON, supra note 53.
152 Bacon died before reaching "Simony," and the work was completed by Sergeant

Sayer and Owen Ruffhead. See J. MARVIN, supra note 9, at 85.
158This is explained in the preface to the fifth edition. M. BACON, supra note 53, at viiviii (5th ed. H. Gwillim, London 1798).
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tise on both formal and informal contracts (including mortgages)
survives in manuscript form as well. 1 Some of Gilbert's works appeared in more than one version, and many appeared unfinished,""
or without attribution of his authorship. Further investigation
might well locate other works by him, or derivations from his writings; I suspect that A General Abridgment of Cases in Equity
(1732)156 may be an example. In the absence of a scholarly study of

Gilbert's life and work it may be premature to form a view about
how or why he came to write so much; so far as I know there is no
direct evidence on the question. It is at least probable, however,
that Gilbert had been engaged upon a comprehensive encyclopedia
of the law, and that the treatises are, as it were, segments of a
work of this character developed out of the abridgment tradition.
If this conjecture is correct, Gilbert anticipated Halsbury1 57 by
about two centuries. What induced him to attempt so monumental
a work is mysterious indeed. 158
Blackstone was, of course, an institutional writer, not a writer
of monographs, and ostensibly he wrote not for lawyers, but for
what is now called the intelligent layman-a concept that includes
law students at the beginning of their course of study. Now Blackstone, it must be remembered, was essentially a civilian and an academic; his disappointed ambition was to become Professor of
Civil Law at Oxford. His principal contact with legal practice dates
from after the publication of the Commentaries,not before; had he
never become Vinerian Professor and published his great work, I
think it is safe to say that no one would ever have heard of him as
a common lawyer. 159 The Commentaries do not arise from the
common law. Though the scheme dates back to Hale,160 nothing
remotely resembling them in execution had appeared in the English language before.
We should not forget, however, that in the eighteenth century
quite a number of very substantial legal works, presumably in2" Hargrave Ms. 265, British Library.

155 "It was the hard fate of the excellent writings of the late Chief Baron Gilbert, to lose
their Author, before they had received his last corrections and improvements, and in that
unfinished state to be thrust into the world, without even the common care of an ordinary
editor." M. BACON, supra note 53, at iii (5th ed. H. Gwillim, London 1798).
I" ANON., GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF CASEs IN EQurrY (London 1732, 1756).
157 See text at note 53 supra.
8 Short biographies of Gilbert appear in 7 DicroNARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 1204
(1939), and E. Foss, supra note 9, at 300.
159 See 12 W. HOLDSwORTH, supra note 77, at 702-37.
"'* See text and note at note 54 supra.
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tended for educated laymen rather than specialists, were published
in English and appear to have been well received. These works belong to the civil and natural law tradition, though one such work,
Thomas Wood's An Institute of the Laws of England or the Laws
of England in their Natural Order, according to Common Life
(1720)61 took as its subject matter the common law. Wood's New
Institute of the Imperial or Civil Law had first been published in
1704;162 included in later editions, without acknowledgement, was a
treatise on laws in general by Jean Domat. 16 s The New Institute
was essentially a comparative study "Composed for the Use of
some Persons of Quality,

1 64

as the intelligent layfolk were then

called; Wood claimed in his preface that common and civil law
were more similar in substance than was generally appreciated:
But if there is that wide difference between the Common
and Civil Laws in their forms of Pleading and manner of
Tryal, this is only the stile, practice, and course of the Courts.
I contend that there is a mixture in the Principles,Maxims
and Reasons of these two Laws; and indeed the Laws of all
Countries are mixed with1the
Civil Law, which have arrived to
5
any degree of perfection.

Baron Pufendorf's Of the Law of Nature and Nations e6 appeared
in translation in 1710, and again in 1729. In 1722, two years after
the publication of Wood's Institute of the Laws of England, William Strahan published a translation of Jean Domat's The Civil
Law in its Natural Order: Together with the Public Law, 161 whose

methodizing title had been imitated by Wood. The thinking be-

"'T. WOOD, supra note 105. Nine later editions appeared between 1722 and 1774.
Thomas Wood (1661-1722) was a Cambridge Doctor of Laws and was Rector of Hardwick in
Buckinghamshire. His attempt to methodize English law on a civilian basis was anticipated
by John Cowell's INSTITUMONES IURis ANGLiCAN! AD MErHODUM E-r
SERIEM INsTrruTioNEM
IhPERALIUm ComposrrAE ET DIGESTAE (Cambridge 1605).
,611
T. WOOD, NEw INsTrrUTE OF THE IMPERML OR Cir LAW (London 1704). The first

edition was published anonymously. There were later editions in 1712, 1721, and 1730.
6I See note 167 infra. For discussion of the relationship between the English civilians
and Continental legal writing, see Coing, Das Schrifttum der englischen Civilians und die
Kontinentale Rechtsliteratur in der Zeit zwischen 1550 und 1800, 5 Ius COMMUNE (1975).
See generally Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorporation (pts. 1-3), 61 B.U.L. REV. 1,

315 (1981) (part 3 forthcoming).

I" T. WOOD, supra note 162, title page.
165Id. at xi.
16 S. PUyENDORF, DE JuRE NATURAE ET GENTIUM (London 1672).
167 J. DOMAT, THE CiVIL LAW IN rrs NATURAL ORDER TOGETHER wrrH Ta PUBLIC LAW

(W. Strahan trans., London 1722).
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hind this publication, as explained by Strahan, was that Domat
contained "all the fundamental maxims of law and equity, which
must be the same in all countries."' ' This is the essential credo of
the natural lawyers. The preface to this venture, which must, to
judge from the number of later editions, have been successful, contains an elaborate argument for the utility of the work to common
lawyers, a number of whom appear in the list of subscribers to the
first edition. John Ayliffe's A New Pandect of Roman Civil Law, a
massive work of scholarship, was published in 1734.169 Ayliffe fol-

lows Wood precisely, even to the point of plagiarism, in his claim
for substantive similarity between civil and common law.17 0 Ayliffe's book does not appear to have been particularly successful.
Jean Jacques Burlamaqui's Principlesof Natural and Politic Law,
by contrast, was received much more enthusiastically; published in
a translation by Nugent in 1752,17' it went into numerous other

editions-in 1763 and 1784 in England, and in 1792, 1807, and
1830 in America. John Taylor's Elements of the Civil Law,171 an

extraordinarily successful work, which went into eight editions between 1754 and 1828, was intended "to Serve for an Introduction
to the Study of the Civil Law; or rather, to contain the Principles
of Law in General.'

73

It was conceived as offering a scheme of gen-

eral education that Taylor had devised at the instance of the Earl
of Granville for his grandsons, to whom Taylor had been tutor. In
this capacity he had been asked "to lay out the Rudiments of Civil
Life, and of Social Duties; to enquire into the Foundations of Justice and Equity; and to examine the principal Obligations, which
arise from these several Connections, into which Providence has
thought proper to distribute the Human Species."'' Here was a
law course designed for the education of gentlemen. In 1754-56 appeared Thomas Rutherforth's Institutes of Natural Law, 765 the
I" Id. at vi (2d ed. London 1737).
161J. AyLvur, A Nzw PANDECT OF ROMAN Cwvn LAw (London 1734). Ayliffe (1676-1732)
was an Oxford Doctor of Civil Law who was expelled from the University and degraded in
1714. His book contains a discussion of the nature of law, id. at 5-25, and this includes an
attack upon reliance on precedents as opposed to principle and reason, id. at 8.
170 Id. at xlvii.
171 The work was translated in two stages: Tan PRiNcYrLTs OF NATURAL LAw (T. Nugent
trans., London 1748); Tim PmNcn'aLEs OF POLmC LAW (T. Nugent trans., London 1752).
Subsequent editions combined the two parts.
17 J. TAYLOR, ELEMENTS OF THE CIvIL LAW (Cambridge 1755).
17$ Id. at iii.
174 Id.
176 T. RUTHmotwOT,
INsTrUTEs OF NATURAL LAw (Cambridge 1754-56). There was a
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only major work on natural law by an English writer in the eighteenth century.176 All these were scholarly, substantial works, written in stylish prose and available in handsome editions. Nothing
comparable had emerged from the common law tradition since
Bracton's monumental work five centuries before, which itself had
been written with a degree of civilian influence.
After becoming the first Vinerian Professor of English Law in
1758, Blackstone set himself the task of doing for the common law
what had already been done for the civil law, and vindicating his
new charge as a rational system "built upon the soundest foundations, and approved by the experience of ages. ' 177 Indeed, while
extolling the virtues of the civil law he sounded a note of caution:
"[W]e must not carry our veneration so far as to sacrifice our Alfred and Edward to the manes of Theodosius and Justinian....
[I]f an Englishmanmust be ignorant of either the one or the other,
he had better be a stranger to the Roman than the English institutions. 17 s A spirit of nationalistic self-satisfaction permeates the
Commentaries, and it is striking that once English law had been
expressed in the language of the scholar and the gentleman, as civil
law previously had been, common law legal writing took on a literary character it had previously lacked. The success of Blackstone
encouraged the writing of more detailed studies of branches of the
law that had been treated only in outline form by the master. Furthermore, the discursive literary style of the Commentaries, which
sharply differentiated such a work from glosses or lists of maxims,
must have furthered the idea that this was the better way to expound the principled science of the law.
In the later eighteenth century a number of significant
monographs were published; the two earliest, described as "essays," were Charles Fearne's Essay on the Learning of Contingent
Remainders and Executory Devises (1772)179 and Sir William
second English edition in 1779 and an American edition, printed at Baltimore in 1832. As
the title page indicates, the work was based on H. GRoTius, DE JURE BTLx ET PACIS (Paris
1625).
178 A possible exception is William Paley's PRINCPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSopHy (Philadelphia 1788). In eighteenth-century thought the study of law and the study of
ethics were not clearly distinguished, and the boundaries between works on natural law, civil
law, and moral philosophy were uncertain.
177 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 5.
179 Id.

179C. FEARNE, ESSAY ON THE LEARNING OF CONTINGENT REMAINDERS AND EXECUTORY DE(London 1772). The work went through 10 English editions between 1772 and 1844,
and it appeared in an American edition in 1819.
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Jones's Essay on the Law of Bailments (1781). 80 Both works were
of an elegant but esoteric character. Neither Fearne nor Jones
came to legal writing through distinction in practice; both were
primarily of an academic bent. Though they were different in their
range of interests, Fearne being essentially insular, while Jones
stood in the natural law tradition, both men believed in the scientific character of law.
Precisely what inspired Fearne at the age of thirty to publish
his Essay (or earlier, in 1769, his Historical and Legigraphical
Chart of Landed Property in England181 ) is obscure, but it may
have been an attempt to establish a reputation as a lawyer by capitalizing on the controversy generated by Perrinv. Blake (1770)181
over the Rule in Shelley's Case.18 3 Under his editorship the essay
grew from 98 pages in 1772 to 450 pages in 1776; by 1791 the part
dealing with contingent remainders alone ran to 558 pages."8 '
Fearne's Essay was in no sense a condensation of cases; the text
stands on its own and the cases are relegated to side note
references.
William Jones, who had originally found the study of law repulsive, changed his mind in 1767 after reading Fortescue, and
practiced law after 1775 in London until he became a judge in India. Jones's Essay was self-consciously based on a system that he
thought could be applied to any branch of the whole science of the
law:
I propose to begin with treating the subject analytically,
and, having traced every part of it up to the first principles of
natural reason, shall proceed historically, to show with what
perfect harmony those principles are recognised and established by other nations, especially the Romans, as well as by
our English courts, when their decisions are properly under""'W. JONES, supra note 120. The book went through four English editions between
1781 and 1833. The first American edition appeared at Boston in 1796. Other "Essays" from
this period are R. PRESTON, ELEMENTARY TREATISE, BY WAY OF ESSAY, ON THE QuANTITY oF
ESTATES (Exeter 1791); and the Essays of John Joseph Powell discussed in text and notes at
notes 197-204 infra.
181

C. FEARNE, HISTORICAL AND LEGIGRAPHICAL CHART OF LANDED PROPERTY IN ENGLAND,

FROM THE TIME OF THE SAXONS TO THE PRESENT ERA (London 1769).
182 4 Burr. 2579, 98 Eng. Rep. 355 (K.B. 1770).
183 For biographical information on Fearne, see 6 DICTIONARY OP NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY
1138 (1939); 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 77, at 373-75.
18 Fearne did not live to edit for the fourth edition the portion of the works dealing
with executory devises; they were done by John Joseph Powell, and the edition was published in 1795.
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stood and clearly distinguished; after which I shall resume
synthetically the whole learning of bailments, and expound
such rules, as, in my humble apprehension, will prevent any
farther perplexity on this interesting
title, except in cases very
85
peculiarly circumstanced.

Jones was a linguist of extraordinary ability (he knew sixteen languages and had some acquaintance with twelve more) and an outstanding scholar. Law was but one of his interests; his work on
bailments, published when he was thirty-five, was in all probability
the result of a purely intellectual interest in trying out a new system of legal exposition. Plans to publish a treatise on maritime
contracts and an edition of Littleton never came to fruition, nor
did he live to carry out his great scheme of becoming the Justinian
of India.188
Fearne and Jones were followed by a number of treatise writers of varying attainments, the most important being Park, Bayley,
Kyd, and Powell. James A. Park (1763-1838) produced his System
of the Law of Marine Insurances' at the age of twenty-five, only
three years after he became a barrister. This considerable and innovative work was produced under the patronage of Lord Mansfield "18 and was no doubt written to establish Park in his career. It
went into many editions. 8 9 John Bayley (1763-1841) wrote his
Treatise on the Law of Bills of Exchange9 " in 1789 at the age of
twenty-six; at that point he had not been called to the bar, though
he had joined Gray's Inn six years earlier and may have been a
special pleader. In its original form Bayley's short book comprised
185 W. JoNEs, supra note 180, at 4. In the second edition, Jones proposed to continue
applying his system:
Should the method used in this little tract be approved, I may possibly not want inclination, if I do not want leisure, to discuss in the same form every branch of English
law, civil and criminal, private and publick; after which it will be easy to mould into
distinct works the three principal divisions, or the analytical, the historical,and the
synthetic parts.
Id. at 4 (2d ed. London 1798).
188 For biographical information on Jones, see 10 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY
1062-65 (1939). On his place in intellectual history, particularly in the United States, see
Ferguson, The Emulation of Sir William Jones in the Early Republic, 52 NEw ENGLAND Q.
3 (1979).
1.8 J. PARK, A SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF MARNE INSURANCES (London 1787).
z See J. MARviN, supra note 9, at 555.
189 There were eight English and two American editions between 1787 and 1842.
190 J. BAYLEY, A SHORT TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, CASH BILLS, AND
PROMIssORY NOTES (London 1789). This book also was popular, appearing in five English
and two American editions by 1836.
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a collection of principles only, and did not state the cases from
which these principles were derived. Unlike collections of maxims,
however, it adopted a literary form similar to that of Fearne and
Jones; it was a prototypical treatise. Stewart Kyd (?-1811), a controversial political figure, wrote treatises on Bills of Exchange
(1790),191 Awards (1791),192 and Corporations (1793-94); 118 part of
the last work was produced in the Tower while Kyd was awaiting
trial for treason.19 It is not clear why Kyd, who also continued
Comyn's Digest of the Laws of England in the 1792 edition,1 5 took
to legal writing. He does not appear to have written in order to
establish himself at the bar as a young man, and may have simply
needed the money-though one would not wish to dismiss other
possible motivations, such as love of scholarship. All these writers
were concerned with commercial law, a field much developed under
Lord Mansfield's Chief Justiceship. John Joseph Powell (ca. 17551800),196 the remaining important and successful treatise writer of
the late eighteenth century, operated in other areas, producing major works on Mortgages (1785),'1 7 Powers (1787),198 Devises
(1788),191 and Contracts (1790),200 as well as compiling a collection
of conveyancing precedents that was published posthumously in

"1 S. KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE (London 1790). There were
further English editions in 1791 and 1798, and American editions in 1798 and 1800.
192 A TREATIS ON THE LAW OF AWARDS (London 1791). Further English editions appeared in 1795 and 1799, and there was an American edition in 1808.
19 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS (London 1793-94). There was no later
edition.
IU He is not the only legal writer to find himself in such a situation. Baron von
Pufendorf started musing about the nature of law and legal sanctions during a term of eight
months' imprisonment in Denmark. See GREAT JURISTS OF THE WORLD 306 (J.MacDonell &
E. Manson eds. 1914).
115 J. CoMYNs, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (3d ed. London 1792) (1st ed. London
1762-67).

"' For biographical information, see 16 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 245 (1939).
J. POWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES (London 1785). This work ap-

197

peared in further English editions in 1787, 1791, 1799, 1822, and 1826. There was a Dublin
edition in 1791 and an American edition in 1828.
198 AN ESSAY ON THE LEARNING RESPECTING THE CREATION AND EXECUTION OF POWERS
(London 1787). Editions appeared in Dublin in 1791 and in London in 1799. Kent deemed
this a "very repulsive" work. 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 322 "n.b (New
York 1830).
I" AN EssAY UPON THE LEARNING OF DEvISES (London 1788). There were English editions in 1807 and 1827, an Irish edition in 1791, and American editions in 1806, 1807, 1822,
and 1838.
200 AN ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS (London 1790). The work
was reprinted twice in Dublin, and there were six American editions up to 1825.
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1802201 and again in 1810. He also edited Fearne in 1795202 and is

thought to have been his pupil. He had been admitted to the Middle Temple in 1775 and called to the bar in 1780, but what impelled him towards legal writing is not known. His books, which
were well received, expressed the standard theory of the time: law
was a science founded upon principle, and the aim of the treatise
writer was to "discover the general rules and principles of natural
and civil equity' '20 upon which the decisions of the courts were
based. Expressing the classic credo of the treatise writers, Powell
explained that "[a]U reasoning must be founded on first principles.
The science of the law derives its principles either from that artificial system which was incidental to the law of feuds, or from the
science of morals. 204
In nineteenth-century England the treatise came to be the
typical form of creative legal literature. Although legal periodicals
had been in existence for some time, they did not provide an outlet
for scholarly writing2 05 until the Law Quarterly Review was inaugurated in 1885, and it is only in our century that they have become quantitatively significant. The other innovation in nineteenth-century legal writing was the collection of leading cases, the
first example of which was John W. Smith's A Selection of Leading Cases on Various Branches of the Law with Notes (183740).206 This type of literature enjoyed considerable favor, and numerous collections appeared before the idea of relating the
casebook to a particular method of legal instruction was conceived
by Christopher Columbus Langdell at Harvard in 1870.207 Later in
the century an attempt to produce a casebook without commen20'

ORIGINAL PRECEDENTS IN CONVEYANCING

202

See C.

203

J. POWELL, supra note 200, at iii.

FEARNE,

(London 1802).

supra note 179 (4th ed. London 1795).

204 Id. at v.
200 For example, The Law Journal, which began publishing in 1803, reported recent

cases, statutes, and law books, printed "original communications from correspondents," and
provided "useful tables including accurate lists of bankrupts, distinguishing such of them as
have obtained their certificates or writs of supersedeas." 1 LAw J. title page. (London 1803).
20 J. SMITH, A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES ON VARIOUS BRANCHES OF THE LAW WITH
NOTES (London 1837-40). Nine further editions appeared before 1900, and editions continued to be produced in the twentieth century. An American edition appeared in 1844, and J.
MARVIN, supra note 9, at 651, notes that "the volumes have been frequently cited, with
approbation, by the bench." For other examples, see 0. TUDOR & F. WHTE, LEADING CASES
IN EQUITY (London 1849-50); 0. TUDOR, LEADING CASES ON MERCANTILE AND MARITIME LAW

(London 1850); 0.

TUDOR, LEADING CASES ON REAL PROPERTY, CONVEYANCING, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS AND DEEDS (London 1856).
207 See A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 174-80 (1967).
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tary, directly modeled on Langdell's Cases in Contract0 8 and intended for the same pedagogical purpose, failed in the sense that
the case method never really caught on in English legal education."0 9 The dominance of the treatise was not affected by these
experiments, and to this day in England there is no indication of
any decline in the vogue for treatise writing. The continual production of such works, even in fields such as contract law that have
been worked over and over for nearly two centuries by a multitude
of writers, must reflect a curious stagnation in English private law,
or at least in certain parts of it.
Many of the authors of the nineteenth-century treatises are
still, in name at least, familiar to all English lawyers (however forgotten they may have become in America), because their works
have lived on in "editions," or are still consulted on occasion, or
are mentioned in later works that are still consulted. English lawyers still know of Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant,21 0 Sugden on
Vendors and Purchasers,2 1 1 Chitty on Contract, 212 Stephen on
Pleading, 1 s Lewin on Trusts, 2 4 Jarman on Wills, 215 Williams on
Real Property,2 18 Blackburn on Sale, 217 Williams on Personal Property,21 8 Taylor on Evidence, 21 9 Mayne on Damages, 22 0 Fry on Specific Performance,2 2 1 Lindley on Partnership,22 2 Benjamin on
Sale, 223 Pollock on Contract, 224 Anson on Contract,2 25 and Pollock
208 C. LANGDELL,

A

SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

(1871).

201 See G. FINCH, CASES ON THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT (1886). This was repub-

lished in 1890, and a scaled-down version appeared in 1922 as C. KENNY, A SELECTION OF
CASES ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT.
210 W. WOODFALL, THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT (London 1802).
211 E. SUGDEN, A CONCISE AND PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF VENDORS AND PURCHASERS OF ESTATES (London 1805).
"I

J. CHITT,

A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (London

1826).

213 H.J. STEPHEN, supra note 8.
214 T. LEWIN, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEs (London

1837).
215T. JARMAN, A TREATISE ON WILLS (London 1844).
'" J. WILLIAMS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (London 1845).
217 C. BLACKBURN, A TREATISE ON THE EFFECT OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE (London 1845).
211J. WILLIAMS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (London 1848).
1I P. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND
IRELAND (London 1848).
220 J. MAYNE, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES (London 1856).
121 E. FRY, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (London 1858).
222 N. LINDLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (London 1863).
113 J. BENJAMIN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (London 1868).
214 F. POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN EQUITY (1876).
25 W. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT AND OF AGENCY IN ITS RELATION TO CONTRACT (1879).
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on Tort.226 Sadly, the most successful of all is possibly the worst of
the lot, Archbold's Criminal Pleading and Evidence (1822),227 a
work that remains to this day (albeit in a much-edited form) the
essential do-it-yourself manual for the English criminal
practitioner.
The authors of the nineteenth century were men of varied
backgrounds. Some few, such as Archbold, appear to have been
primarily legal writers, 22 while others, such as Chitty, 229 were practitioners who were also involved in legal education. Some wrote as
young men to advertise themselves, 230 or simply to make ends
meet.23 ' More curious explanations exist with regard to why some
lawyers turned to authorship. Leake apparently was encouraged to
write after his deafness had ruined his law practice. 23 2 .Woodfall, it
is said, broke his leg. In the later nineteenth century the tradition
of treatise writing by academics began with Pollock 23a and Anson,2 3S though it is only in recent times that academics have tended
to predominate. This is hardly surprising; only since the Second
World War has university-based legal education existed on any
considerable scale in England.3 5
220 F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS (1887).
227 J. ARCHBOLD, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (London 1822). The fortieth edition was published in 1979.
228 Archbold was one of the most prolific of the nineteenth-century legal writers in Eng-

land, although little appears to be known about his life. In addition to his work on criminal
pleading and evidence, see note 227 supra, he also wrote the DIGEST OF THE LAW RELATIVE
TO PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN ACTIONS REAL, PERSONAL, AND MIXED (London 1821) and THE
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER (London 1840).
228 For information on Joseph Chitty Sr. (1776-1841), see 4 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY 266 (1939).
20 For example, J.F. Archbold (1785-1870) published A DIGEST OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN (London 1813) before being called to the bar in 1814; Sugden (1781-1875) published
his PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAWS OF VENDORS AND PURCHASERS OF ESTATES (London

1805) before his call to the bar in 1807. Chitty published A TREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE
(London 1799) at the age of 23. See 4 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 266-67 (1939)
(Chitty); 19 id. at 152-54 (Sugden); 22 id. at 54-55 (Archbold).
22 Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the young John Campbell ghosted a book
on partnership for this purpose. See 1 LIFE OF JOHN, LORD CAMPBELL 194 (M. Hardcastle ed.
1881). The book is thought to be the work that appeared as W. WATSON, THE LAW OF PARTNERsHip (London 1794).
222 C. FIFOOT, JUDGE AND JURIST IN THE REIGN OF VICTORIA 27 n.3 (1959). Leake is not
noticed by the Dictionary of National Biography.
23 See F. POLLOCK, supra notes 224, 226; the works were written while Pollock was
Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford. For biographical information on Pollock, see
W. HOLDSWORTH, SOME MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAW 279-90 (1938).
'4 See W. ANSON, supra note 225. The work was written shortly before Anson was
made Warden of All Souls College, Oxford.
235 In America, law schools developed much earlier, but it was only after the appoint-
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Nineteenth-century treatises vary greatly in quality, and at
their worst are disorderly, rambling works of condensation not
much better than Sheppard's Actions on the Case.2 - 6 At their best
they are elegantly written and highly systematic, expressing an
ideal clearly stated by H.J. Stephen in 1837 in the preface to his
treatise on Pleading.2 3 7 Stephen claimed that in no other publication on pleading
has any attempt been hitherto made to develop systematically
the principles of this science, or, in other words, to explain its
scope and tendency, to select from the mass of its various
rules such as seem to be of a primary and fundamental kind,
and to trace the connection of these rules, and show their
bearing as part of a general scheme or system.2 8
In order to achieve this "not only novel but difficult" 3 9 object, Stephen had to "subject the science of Pleading to a new order or
arrangement, such as seemed to him best adapted to the exposition
of these principles in the clearest light. For that arrangement he
[had] no authority to produce. ' 24 0 Treatises produced in this selfconsciously selective and methodizing spirit have come to be distinguished from others that offer a more comprehensive treatment
of the case law, the latter being known in England as "practitioners' books." More fundamentally, however, the distinction reflects
a contrast between a concept of law rooted in reason, and one
rooted in authority. Plainly, treatises written in the spirit of the
former offer the treatise writer a more elevated status in the
scheme of things. An aim somewhat similar to Stephen's was expressed by Joshua Williams in the preface to his successful book
on Real Property (1845); he attempted "to give to each principle
its adequate importance-from the crowds of illustrations to present the best. '24 1 Pollock, in a typically pompous prefatory letter
to Holmes in his book on Torts (1886), claimed that "this is a book
of principles if it is anything. Details are used, not in the manner
of a digest, but so far as they may seem called for to develop and

ment of Langdell to the deanship at Harvard that the practice of appointing young men to

full-time university teaching positions began. See A. SUTHERLAND,supra note 207, at 183-91.
"' W. SHEPPARD, supra note 40.
21 H.J. STEPHEN, supra note 8.
I" Id. at viii (3d ed. 1901) (emphasis in original).
23

Id.

340
1

Id. at viii-ix.
J.WILLIAMS, supra note 216, at i.
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illustrate the principles. '24 2 So the treatise writers of the nineteenth century, insofar as they consciously embraced a theory of
law, inherited and claimed to express the belief that private law
consisted essentially of a latent scheme of principles whose workings could be seen in and illustrated by the decisions of the courts,
where they were developed and applied. The text writer set out to
expound these principles in a rational, coherent manner, as was
appropriate to a science.
So far as the form of the treatise is concerned, the most interesting development in the nineteenth century belongs to the history of the codification movement. A number of treatises were
written in the form of codes, the code being the next logical step in
the process of systematization beyond the discursive treatise. This
was attempted by Fitzjames Stephen, Chalmers, and Pollock, and
their efforts were imitated by others. The development is in a
sense an obvious one. Once the law had been set out in a discursive
manner as a methodical scheme of principles, rules, and exceptions, the idea developed that it would be possible to replace the
bulk and complexity of these treatises with more concise statements of the main principles, similar in brevity to the old maxims
of the common law. Further exposition could be supplied by commentary. This possibility was explored first by Stephen in his successful Digest of the Law of Evidence (1876),24s and in his Digest
of the Criminal Law (1877).2 In that year Pollock produced his
Digest of the Law of Partnership245 on the same model; it went
into numerous editions. In 1878, Chalmers's Digest of the Laws of
Bills of Exchange24s adopted the same scheme, as did his Sale of
Goods (1890)247 and his Digest of the Law Relating to Marine Insurance (1901).24' Dicey's Conflict of Laws (1896),249 continuously
revised by later editors, is perhaps the best known of the works
that have perpetuated this format to the present day.
These works were all consciously conceived of as steps toward

242

F. POLLOCK, supra note 226, at viii.

243 J.F. STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1870).
24"

J.F. STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1877).

245

F.

246 M.

POLLOCK, DIGEST OF THE LAw OF PARTNERSHIP (1877).
CHALMERS, DIGEST OF THE LAw OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY NOTES, AND

CHEQUES (1878).
247 M.

CHALMERS, THE SALE OF GOODS (1890).

248 M.

CHALMERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW RELATING TO MARINE INSURANCE (1901).

249

W.

DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF

LAws (London 1896).
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codification, and were modeled on the form of the Indian codes; 250
Chalmers's was the most successful experiment in this genre, inasmuch as his work formed the basis for actual legislation. 51 With
the decline in the interest in codification this form of literature has
not increased in popularity, though examples survive in England.
On a comparative plane, one should of course note the historical
role of the treatise in civil law systems, where the work of the
greatest treatise writer, Pothier, did indeed serve as the basis for
the civil code. 52
Though the legal theory associated with the treatise tradition
is still expressed to this day, there has been, I suspect, a significant
decline in the belief that legal principles (or at least some of them)
are of universal validity; hence, the link between the treatise and
the belief in natural law has become attenuated. This development
may be subtly related to the formal status of the treatise in the
English theory of precedent, which is that the opinion of a treatise
writer generally is not authoritative. 253 There is a convention of

formal legal argument that normally excludes the citation of treatises as a mode of justifying assertions about what the law is. Al'though practice is not uniform in the English courts and is becoming more flexible, it is generally said that the arguments of a
treatise writer can be adopted as part of an argument, but not offered as a warrant that the argument is correct; there are exceptions to this in the case of certain "works of authority," such as
Hawkins. Although this convention is irrelevant to any assessment
of the general influence of treatise writers upon the form and substance of the law, it does reflect the notion that only holders of
high judicial office enjoy the power to issue authoritative statements of the law.
One can also point to the generally low status of law schools
and legal academics in England as a partial explanation for the
English attitude toward treatise writers. Furthermore, many authors were young men and not prestigious figures when they published their treatises (though some became celebrated later in life,
either through success in practice, or through a reputation for
250
251

See generally C. FIFOO, supra note 232.
See Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c.61; Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 &

57 Vict., c.71.
252 See text and notes at notes 308-309 infra. For discussion of the influence of Pothier
and other civilians on the development of the law in nineteenth-century England, see Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 61 LAW Q. RFv. 247, 255-57 (1975).
252 See A.R.W. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAw 194 (1961).
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learning acquired by means of their writings). To writers who
claimed to be formulating universal rational principles, the lack of
personal authority was not particularly significant; it was what
they wrote, not the identity of the author, that mattered. But with
the decline of this spirit the treatise writer's formal status inevitably declines as well, for what he says then appears to matter only
to the extent that it can be supported by judicial authority, or is
accepted as correct by the judiciary. He who has no authority himself comes to rely on authority and not on pure reason. This approach is seen already in Chalmers, who, in a preface to his Digest
of 1878, explained that a proposition of law in such a work (as contrasted with an authoritative code) "merely amounted to a verifiable hypothesis as to what the law is."'2 " The verification he had in
mind was verification by reference to cases. This is the spirit of
positivism, which is of course antithetical to that of the natural
lawyers.
V
In America the history of the legal treatise took a different
course. Law publishing for lawyers began in the late eighteenth
century 255 with the republication in 1788 of a pair of English
works, Buller's Nisi Prius 256 and Gilbert's Law of Evidence,2 57 and
already by the end of the century several English treatises had appeared in American editions, including Park's Marine Insurance
(1789, 1799, and 1800),258 Kyd's Bills of Exchange (1796 and
1800),259 and Jones on Bailment (1796).260 So far as institutional
works were concerned, Blackstone's Commentaries were enormously successful in America; there were American editions in
1771-72 and 1790. In the early nineteenth century the practice of
relying on English texts, whether imported or produced in special
2 62 refers
editions, continued.2 6 1 J.G. Marvin's Legal Bibliography
2" M. CHALMERS, supra note 246, at vi.

25 See generally James, A List of Legal Treatises Printedin the British Colonies and
the American States before 1801, in HARvARu LEGAL ESSAYS (R. Pound ed. 1934).
2"

F.

BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT

Nisi PRIUS'(New

York 1788) (1st ed. London 1772).
257 G. GILBERT, supra note 142 (Philadelphia 1788).
" J. PARK, supra note 187 (Philadelphia 1789; 2d American ed. Boston 1799; 3d American ed. Boston 1800).
2159S. KYD,supra note 191 (Boston 1798; 2d American ed. Boston 1800).
260 W. JONES, supra note 180 (Boston 1796).
261 Early law reviews in America devoted considerable space to book notices and reviews, and inevitably much of the material was English. Thus the opening number of one
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to innumerable examples of this practice. Thus Joseph Story began
his career as a text writer by editing English texts-Joseph Chitty's A Treatise on Bills of Exchange in 1808 and 1819,263 Charles
Abbott's A Treatise on the Law Relative to Merchant Ships and
Seamen in 1810 and 1829,216 and Edward Lawe's A PracticalTreatise on Pleading in Assumpsit in 1811.65 A work such as J.F.
Archbold's Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases, edited in
New York in 1843,6 is described by Marvin as "a standard work
of great practical utility in England and America, 2' 6 7 and J.C. Perkins's 1841 edition of Chitty's A PracticalTreatise on the Criminal Law26s is said to have had "an extended circulation" and to
have been "generally used ... as the book on criminal law."2 69
Aside from statutory material and books intended for laymen,
the earliest steps toward an indigenous legal literature took the
form of publication, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, of law reports. The first significant expository work was
Zephaniah Swift's System of the Law of Connecticut (1795-96),70
making Swift the first American treatise writer. Nathan Dane's
Abridgement,2 1 published in eight volumes between 1823 and
1829, facilitated treatise writing in America. It was the first attempt to offer American lawyers an alternative to the English
abridgments (particularly Bacon's Abridgement)2 72 on which they
review announced that one of its functions would be "to notice all the new treatises, Digests, & etc. both English and American." 1 UNITED STATES L. INTELLIGENCER & Rxv. 1
(1829) (emphasis in original). The American Jurist also regularly noted new English

publications.

262 J. MARIN,supra note 9.
263 J.CHrrTY, supra note 230

(Boston & Philadelphia 1809).

2" See C. ABBOTT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO MERCHANT SHIPS AND SEAMEN

.(2d American ed. Newburyport 1810; 4th American ed. Boston 1829) (1st ed. London 1802).
265 E. LAWES, PRACTICAL TREATISE ON PLEADING IN ASSUMPSIT (Boston 1811) (1st ed.
London 1810).
216 J.ARCHBOLD, supra note 227 (4th American ed. 1843).
267 J. MARWiN, supra note 9, at 67.
268 J.CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW (4th American ed. 1843) (1st
ed. London 1816).
26, J.MARvN, supra note 9, at 192. Marvin lists 76 treatises on criminal law in America
by 1847. Of these only two are wholly American treatises: H. TOULMIN & J. BLAIR, A REVIEW
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY (Frankfort 1804) and L. Kerr,
EXPOSITION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS

(New Orleans 1806).

Neither of them supplanted the imported texts.

A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (Windham 1795-96).
N. DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW (Boston 1823-29).
271 M. BACON, supra note 53. The first American edition, by Bird Wilson, appeared at
270 Z. Swr,
271

Philadelphia in 1809; John Bouvier produced a much improved version in 1852. Bacon's
Abridgement apparently was the favorite with American practitioners. See J. MARvIN, supra
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had previously been forced to rely. This work, on which Dane had
labored for nearly half a century," 3 was a deliberate attempt to
supply the want of an American statement of post revolutionary
law, and to prevent the fragmentation of the law: "The evil to be
feared in our country is, that so many sovereign legislatures, and as
many Supreme Courts will produce too much law, and in too great
variety; so much, and so various that any general revision will become impracticable." 274 The publication of James Kent's Commentaries' between 1826 and 1830 provided an indigenous alternative
to Blackstone that was hugely successful. In 1829 Joseph Story,
who had been appointed to the Supreme Court in 1811, became
the first holder of the chair endowed by Nathan Dane at Harvard,
and from 1832 until his death in 1845 he published his remarkable
series of treatises, covering Bailments (1832),76 the Constitution
(1833),277 Conflicts (1834),27 s Equity (1835),2 79 Equity Pleading
(1838),28 0 Agency (1839),281 Partnership (1841),82 Bills of Exchange (1843),2s and Promissory Notes (1845).2" Had his health

not broken down (his death was caused partly by overwork 8 5 ), further treatises might well have followed. Thereafter in America the
treatise tradition was firmly established, and such works were produced on an extraordinary scale.
From Story's time onwards, the production of treatises was associated with organized, systematic legal education, which of
course developed much earlier in America than in England, and on
a much more impressive scale. This does not mean that the typical
treatise writer was a cloistered academic, as the law schools until
Langdell's time employed practitioners as professors. But the writnote 9, at 85.
273See J. MARvIN, supra note 9, at 252.
274 N. DANE, supra note 271, at xiv.
217J. KENT,supra note 198.
276 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAiLMENTs (Cambridge, Mass. 1832).
277COMMENTAmES ON THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNIrmD STATES (Boston & Cambridge,
Mass. 1833).
278 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLmCT OF LAWS (Boston 1834).
279 COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (Boston 1836).

EQurrY PLEADINGS (Boston 1838).
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (Boston 1839).
282 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHP (Boston & London 1841).
283 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE (Boston & London 1843).
280COMMENTARIES ON
281

2"COMMENTARIES

ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES (Boston

1845).

See A. SUTHERLAND, supra note 207, at 134. For biographical information, see LIFE
ANm LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY (W. Story ed. Boston 1851); G. DUNNE, JUSTicE JOSEPH STORY
AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1970).
285
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ing of treatises became the appropriate activity for law professors.
With the development of an indigenous treatise literature, often of
higher quality than anything available in England, reliance upon
imported books, or American editions of such books, became less
necessary. Indeed the quality of American treatises produced a reverse movement: not only were they exported to England, but
there were in some instances specially produced English
editions.2 "
The establishment of the treatise-writing tradition in America
took place in an intellectual climate entirely different from that in
England. The treatises dealt of course with the common law, but
there had, after all, been a revolution in America, and there was a
certain incongruity in the continued use and further reception of a
disorderly body of essentially English law, many aspects of which
were regarded as extremely objectionable. There was also a deepseated dislike and distrust of lawyers as a professional class, and
the evolution of a legal profession in America was in any event a
recent development-one that was by no means generally welcomed. 28 7 The early American legal writers were, in a sense, on the
defensive, and for this reason they were anxious to demonstrate
that the enterprise in which they were engaged, the exposition of
the American common law, was a respectable one. Obviously it
would not do for them to present the common law as English
judge-made law that Americans for some bizarre reason should
continue to respect in spite of the revolution. The Americans wrote
in a nationalistic spirit, and inevitably stressed the American character of the law they were expounding, and the degree to which
English common law had been rejected or modified in America. On
the other hand, the amount of available indigenous material was
limited, and they therefore made extensive use of English materials that could not be presented as possessing any authoritative
character in America.
The theory of the law that was appropriate to their writings
28S Examples

are Story's treatises on Conflict of Laws, supra note 278 (Edinburgh
1835); Equity Pleadings, supra note 280 (London 1838); Agency, supra note 281 (London
1839); Balments, supranote 276 (London 1839); and Equity Jurisprudence, supra note 279
(London 1839). His treatises on Bills of Exchange, supra note 283, and Partnership, supra
note 282, were published simultaneously in England and the United States.
American editions of English treatises survived into this century. See, e.g., W. ANsON,
supra note 225 (5th American ed. New York 1930); Corbin was the editor.
"7 See generally P. MuLEs, THE LI op THE MIND N AMEmcA 99-116 (1965), and for
illustration, the material collected in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA (P. Miller ed. 1962).
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was essentially that of the natural lawyers. The claim that law was
a science was a characteristic refrain. Thus in 1832 Professor
Daniel Mayes chose "Is law a science, or is it something less dignified? ' 288 as the topic for his introductory lecture at Transylvania
University. Not surprisingly, he concluded that it was the former.
A review of his lecture paraphrased what he meant by a science:
When we say that a branch of human knowledge is a science,
we mean in general that it is founded on principles inherent
in the subject to which it relates. We mean also that those
principles serve as a basis whereon we may classify the subjects of that particular branch of knowledge. We mean, further, that such branch of knowledge may be taught by commencing with generals and descending to particulars; and that
in practice we do not grope in the dark, but each particular
case, as soon as it arises, is illustrated to the eye of the skillful
observer, by the clear and steady light of general principles.2 9
As law was a science based on principles, the function of the jurist
was to expound these principles in a systematic manner; in his
search for them he might appropriately use any juridical material
that came to hand, as sources both of illumination and of illustration. The underlying philosophy is particularly clearly set out in an
address by Peter du Ponceau, delivered to students in Philadelphia
in 1824:
General jurisprudence is a part of the common law, but its
rules and principles are not exclusively to be found in common law writers. That science ought to be studied, particularly in this country, where a light is to be held to the judiciaries of twenty-four different States. Whence is this light to
proceed, but from the writings and discussions of liberal and
learned jurists? The conflict of opinions will produce truth,
and truth at last will find its way everywhere. The law should
be treated as any other science; its theories should be
scanned, and its defects pointed out; the excellent principles
with which it abounds should be confronted with the decisions
in which they have been either forgotten or misapplied, and
this course should be pursued until the whole system at last
2 8

Mayes).

Whether Law is a Science, 9 Am. JUR. 349 (1833) (review of lecture by Prof. D.

289 Id. at 349. For further illustration of the dominance of the jurisprudence of the time
by this legal theory, see P. MILLER, supra note 287, at 156-89.
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shall be founded on the basis of universal justice. 90
Story in particular wrote in this eclectic spirit, and quotes in the
preface to his treatise on Agency the assertion by Sir William
Jones that "[w]hat is good sense in one age must be good sense, all
circumstances remaining, in another; and pure unsophisticated
reason is the same in Italy as in England, in the mind of a
Papinian and of a Blackstone. 2 9 1 Jones was indeed something of a
favorite in America, for he had in his Essay2 9 2 pointed the way to a
style of treatise writing suited to American conditions, and had
enunciated clearly the claim that law must be a science in order to
merit the attention of intellectuals.
In this spirit it was possible to ransack not only the English
and American sources, but also those of the civilians and natural
lawyers for the best law, an enterprise that had the additional advantage of demonstrating the author's erudition, thus contributing
to the prestige both of the author and of the task on which he was
engaged. Thus in his preface to the Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence Story remarks: "In many cases I have endeavoured to
show the reasons, upon which these doctrines are founded, and to
foreign jurisprudence, as
illustrate them by principles drawn 2from
93
well as from the Roman Civil Law."
Later in the century Joel Prentice Bishop, 9 4 a Boston lawyer
who abandoned practice to devote himself wholly to treatise writing, at which he was both prolific and extremely successful, wrote a
book, now forgotten, in which he expounded a general theory of
the function of the treatise writer. This, The FirstBook of the Law
(1868),95 was cast in the form of advice to students: it was subtitled "Explaining the Nature, Sources, Books and Practical Application of Legal Science, and Methods of Study and Practice." UnOP. Du

PONCEAU,

A

DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND ExTENT OF THE JURISDICTION

OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 126 (Valedictory Address, Law Academy of Philadelphia, Apr. 22, 1824), reprinted in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA, supra note 287, at 113.

"I Quoted in J. STORY, supra note 281, at vi.
W. JONES, supra note 180.
1' J. STORY, supra note 279, at vi. He made similar remarks in the prefaces to his
treatises on Partnership, supra note 282, at vi, and Bills of Exchange, supra note 283, at vivii.
'" For biographical information, see 2 DICTIONARY OF AmERICAN BIOGRAPHY 295 (A.
Johnson ed. 1929). He established his reputation with J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (Boston 1852). Bishop wrote extensively on a wide variety of
subjects; his best-known other book was his COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAw (Boston
1856-58).
25 J. BISHOP, THE FIRST BOOK OF THE LAw (Boston 1868).
:"
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like the writer of digests, the treatise writer is not concerned
merely to catalogue the multifarious "points adjudged"-"deemed
by idiots to be the law."296 Instead, his task is to "unfold the rules,
the principles, the reasons, which not only governed former decisions, but are to govern subsequent ones.

2

97

These include "inner

principles which perhaps not even the judges saw when they decided the cases.

2

98

Indeed the true treatise writer may find, in

dealing with a particular topic, that "in all the cases the judges had
299

confused ideas, and their observations are not worth anything.

The writer must then discover the true rule, "and he is just as
much entitled to the credit of the discovery, as was Sir Isaac
Newton for the discovery of the law of attraction in nature. 300 In
conformity with this theory, which elevates the status of the text
writer (and Bishop was an enormously vain man), he ridicules the
English attitude toward treatise writers that links authority with
judicial status.30 1 The similarity between Bishop's views and302those
of Langdell is obvious enough and suggestive of derivation.
And so, firmly based on a theory, the American treatises
poured forth, culminating in the vast works-or the ultimate
treatises, as they have been called-of Wigmore,303 Williston,'"
Corbin, 5 and Scott.308
VI
The great enterprise in which the treatise or institutional
writer is engaged is the methodizing of disorderly traditional or
customary law; once the job has been done competently by a
Blackstone or a Story, much of its intellectual excitement disappears. Later treatise writers are relegated to the laborious task of
reworking the same materials or refining matters of detail, and this
is particularly true when the branch of law involved is relatively
static. It requires some dramatic change to give rise to a distin2"

Id. at 127.

297
298

Id. at 126.
Id. at 127.

299

Id. at 140.

300

Id. at 141.

201

Id. at 157-58. He also regarded as absurd the English practice of according treatise

writers authority only after they had died.
302 See text and notes at notes 207-208 supra; text at note 314 infra.
303 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLo-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVDENCE
204 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920-22).
205

A.

306A.

CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS

SCOTT, THE

LAW OF TRuSTs

(1950-51).

(1939).

(1904-05).
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guished new treatise; an example in England is the production of
G.C. Chesire's treatise on property laws07 as a reaction to the reforming legislation of 1925, which so altered the law of property
that it became practically impossible merely to revise earlier texts.
Good treatises will indeed tend to have a conservative effect on the
law to the extent that they are successful; thus much of the conceptual structure of modern contract law was fixed by the early
nineteenth-century treatise literature. In this way, treatises contain the seeds of their own destruction.
This destruction may also come about in another way. After
private law (or indeed any branch of law) has been systematized,
the obvious next step is codification, which will confer a special
authoritative status upon a particular succinct statement of the
principles of the law. This happened in France, for example. There
the indefatigable Pothier, after spending many years on the task of
putting Justinian's Digest into a methodical scheme and some
more on a redaction of the customs of Orleans, set about the writing of treatises, starting with his general treatise on the law of obligations in 1761.308 Thereafter he poured them out at a rate subsequently equalled only by Story. It was Pothier's work that made
the French code possible, and of course the code supplanted the
treatises.3 0 9 The similarity between the ideal of the treatise writer
and that of the codifier is well illustrated by a remark of Portalis
on the aim of codifying legislation: "The function of statutory law
is to determine, in broad perspective, general legal maxims, to establish principles from which inferences can be drawn, and not to
involve itself in the particulars of individual areas."11 0 In the nineteenth century, both in England and America (but more particularly in the latter), there was a powerful movement for codification
but it was largely a failure. In England there remain some flickers
of life in the corpse. In America, the most recent expressions of
this natural evolution out of the treatise have been the RestateG. CHEsIRE, THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1925).
0oR. POTHIER, TRAIT DES OBLIGATIONS (Paris 1761).
3' For discussion of Pothier's influence on the draftsmen of the civil code, see 1 K.
ZWMIGERT & H. KOTz, AN INTRODUCTION TO ComuARATIvE LAW 77 (T. Weir trans. 1977). See
also GREAT JURISTS OF THE WORLD, supra note 194, at 464-76.
310 "L'office de Ia loi est de fixer, par de grandes vues, lea maximes g~n~rales du droit:
d'6tablir des principes fAconds en cons6quences, et non de descendre dans le d6tail des questions qui peuvent naitre sur chaque mati~re." J. PORTALIS, DiscouRs, RAPPORTS ET TRAVAUX
INtDITS SUR LE CODE CIVIL 8 (Paris 1844).
:07
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mentsMn and uniform legislation such as the Uniform Probate
Code. Neither in England nor in America, however, can the decline
of the treatise tradition be explained by reference to the enactment
of comprehensive codes of private law or the natural resultant development of forms of legal literature expounding the codes.
Yet in America, where the common law treatise reached perhaps its ultimate point of development, the genre has by now declined rather markedly from its preeminence. I should like to close
with some speculations about why this is so. From the beginning,
the treatise in America had to contend with the considerable number of different jurisdictions in which the law was administered,
each state potentially possessing its own common law. This obviously presented an obstacle to the exposition of a universal common law by the text writers. Perhaps it was not a fatal obstacle;
the writers could still aim to present a rational scheme of private
law and hope that it would be received in the various state jurisdictions by virtue of its very intellectual force. The jurisdictional
variations were exacerbated by another phenomenon, however: the
rising bulk of legal material, particularly law reports. This development in turn went hand in hand with an increased significance attached to reported decisions. As reports became available, they
were bound to be used. Even in the early nineteenth century, when
the problem hardly existed, the sheer quantity of legal books was a
source of continual alarm and complaint. Joseph Story, back in
1821, spoke eloquently of the groaning shelves of the jurists, and
lamented that "the mass of the law is, to be sure, accumulating
with an almost incredible rapidity." 812 Over a century later, when
the problem had become much more severe, Samuel Williston was
to voice the same complaint.3 13 All this threatened the treatise tradition-how could the systematic writer reconcile his presentation
of the law as a coherent set of principles with the shambles accumulating in the law libraries?
311

Professor Gilmore explains the Restatements as a reaction to the legal realists. See

G. GILMORE, THE DEATH oF CoNTRAcT 55-85 (1974); Gilmore, Legal Realism, Its Cause and
Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1044-45, 1048 (1961). As a matter of chronology this view is not

easy to accept, because the report that led to the initiation of the Restatement project and
the establishment of the American Law Institute was written in 1922, see S. WniLSTON, LiwE
AND THE LAW 310 (1940). Originally there was uncertainty about whether the Restatements
should be in treatise or statutory form.
1i Story, An Address Delivered before the Members of the Suffolk Bar, 1 AM. JuiusT 1,
31 (1829).
31-

S. WMLISTON, supra note 311, at 307-09.
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A possible reaction to this situation is associated with Christopher Columbus Langdell. Langdell did not invent the idea of legal
science, which had been a commonplace of legal thought long
before his time, nor did he invent the casebook. He has, however,
two achievements to his credit or discredit that can be viewed as
relevant to the history of the treatise. First, his version of legal
science was one in which, although the principles of the law were
to be found in decided cases, "the cases which are useful and necessary for this purpose at the present day bear an exceedingly
small proportion to all that have been reported. The vast majority
are useless, and worse than useless, for the purposes of systematic
study."""4 This theory, which, as we have seen, may have been derived from Bishop,3 15 and is in any event implicit in the belief in
leading cases, enabled the treatise writer to purvey a sort of higher
or better law in much the same spirit as that in which the medieval
civilians presented the better law of the Digest. Such a theory enabled the systematizer to cope with bulk and thrive on diversity.
On the other hand, one might maintain that Langdell's other
achievement, the case method of legal instruction, was likely to
have the opposite effect. The case method created a need for a
type of literature that generations of American academics have
spent their energies producing: the casebook, or today the collection of cases and materials. Lectures can readily be turned into
treatises; casebooks cannot. But although after Langdell's time the
production of casebooks and the writing of law review articles (it
was during his deanship that the Harvard Law Review was
founded s16 ) came to absorb a considerable output of creative energy, the great American treatises-multivolume works such as
Wigmore, Williston, Corbin, and Scott-are products of this century; there is no sense in which Langdell's ideas can be said to
have destroyed the treatise.
What appears to me to have had the greatest negative effect
on the treatise-writing tradition in America is the realist movement. This movement, ill-defined though it may have been, involved a scepticism and even a cynicism about the significance of
legal doctrine in the determination of cases, and it has profoundly
affected the attitudes of both those who practice law and adjudiC. LANGDELL, supra note 208, at vi.
See text at note 302 supra.
316 The first number appeared on April 15, 1887. A. SuTHmRLAv
314
315

197-98.

,

supra note 207, at
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cate, and many of those who teach at American law schools. Judicial opinions cease to be regarded as the expression of some rational scheme of principles, but rather as material to be used to
justify and cover with a veneer of respectability arguments or conclusions reached on other grounds. A system of ready access to
such material is all that is needed. The professional services, s11, and
more recently the on-line computer systems such as LEXIS and
WESTLAW, have arisen to meet this need.
A movement that minimizes the importance of legal doctrine
is hardly likely to generate enthusiasm for the work of analyzing
doctrine and expounding it as the principled science of the law.8 18
So influential has the realist movement been that today it is possible for lawyers to express genuine incomprehension at the activities of those who, in earlier periods, believed in the validity and
importance of such work. Lawrence Friedman, the recent author of
the first attempted general history of American law, provides an
illustration when he describes with a combination of unconcealed
derision and bafflement the activities of the draftsmen of the
Restatements:
They took fields of living law, scalded their flesh, drained off
their blood, and reduced them to bones. The bones were arrangements of principles and rules (the black letter law), followed by a somewhat barren commentary ....

The chief

draftsmen, men like Samuel Williston and Austin W. Scott of
31" The origin of looseleaf services in the United States has been traced to the rise of
the federal income tax and its attendant complex regulations. See M. PRICE & H. BrrNMR,
EFFEcTIVE LEGAL RESEARCH 230 (1953).
318 It is of course true that various types of legal literature bearing a passing resemblance to the treatise--"hornbooks," "nutshells," and outlines, for example-are still produced, and there is a considerable market for such elementary student guides to the law
that serve as a sort of map to unfamiliar territory. Perhaps works of this kind are of greater
practical significance than prevailing legal theory would concede. But the prestige has gone
out of writing such works.
A number of more ambitious works that resemble-and in some cases are specifically
referred to by their authors as-treatises have been produced in America recently. Arguably
some of these works are treatises in a broad sense of the term, although it frequently is
possible to exclude them from the definition of the genre derived from Plucknett, see text
and notes at notes 3-8 supra. Thus J. WHT & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER
Tm UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (2d ed. 1980), for example, might be viewed as something
other than a treatise because it consists of commentary on a body of statutory law rather
than a set of deductions from first principles. The same might hold for K. DAvis, ADMNISTRATV LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1978) because of its emphasis on the Administrative Procedure Act; the focus of that work on procedure rather than substantive law would constitute
another ground for exclusion.
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were authors of massive treatises in the strict,

conceptual, Langdell mold. They expended their enormous
talents on an enterprise which, today, seems singularly fruitless. Incredibly, the work of restating (and re-restating) is still
going on.319
Plainly, this view of the enterprise of methodizing the law is incompatible with the treatise tradition, which sets a special value
upon the undertaking that Friedman regards as "singularly fruitless"; in taking this line, Friedman (whom I quote only by way of
example) merely reflects a school of thought that is now perfectly
widespread.
This school of thought, which adopts a somewhat cynical approach to the claim that the common law consists of a body of
principles, and which sees common law adjudication as an arbitrary process, has a long history in both England and America 32 10
There is nothing really new about the iconoclasm of the American
realists. What is new, however, is the reception of their notions
among lawyers, and in this sense the great significance of the realist movement for legal history lies in the recognition that it is possible to have lawyers, and flourishing lawyers, without law in the
sense that law traditionally has been understood. Whether this
state of affairs is to be regretted or welcomed is debatable, but it is
clear that it offers no hospitality to the legal treatise.
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L. FRiEDMAN, A HISTORY op AMERIcAN LAw 582 (1973).
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See generally Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFoRD ESSAYS
77 (A.W.B. Simpson ed. 1973).
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